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ABSTRACT—Few institutions have done more to improve working
conditions for the middle class than labor unions. Their efforts, of course,
cost money. To fund union activities, thousands of collective bargaining
agreements across the nation have long included provisions permitting
employers to require employees to pay “fair share” or “agency” fees. In
public unions—when the employer is the government—this arrangement
creates tension between two important values: the First Amendment’s
protection against compelled expression and the collective benefits of
worker representation. When confronted with this tension forty years ago in
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Supreme Court struck an uneasy
compromise, allowing public sector unions to recoup expenses for
collective bargaining but not for political activity. For decades, the decision
has been a lightning rod with some scholars calling for its reversal and
others insisting on its preservation. In the meantime, the realities of modern
public sector collective bargaining have changed, and First Amendment
jurisprudence has evolved. The Supreme Court, which recently granted
certiorari in Janus v. AFSCME, now has the opportunity to reconsider
Abood’s fragile compromise.
This Article offers a new way forward within the First Amendment
that honors the importance of both union activity and free expression. It
proposes a method to reconcile these twin interests while also updating the
doctrine to account for state legislative efforts, modern union realities, and
First Amendment jurisprudential developments. The Article argues that
agency fees should be brought into step with current political contribution
and campaign finance jurisprudence. Under this middle-ground approach,
some agency fees, but only those that are “closely drawn” to avoid
unnecessary expressive infringement, will remain lawful. This approach
may not satisfy those who ardently oppose agency fees of any kind or those
who want Abood’s rule fully upheld. Still, it emerges as the best way
forward through a difficult terrain: It avoids the false dichotomy between
union and political activities, respects state legislatures that craft innovative
collective bargaining statutes, and grounds public sector agency fees with
other coherent aspects of First Amendment jurisprudence.
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Reconciling Agency Fee Doctrine

INTRODUCTION
For forty years, the law of public sector collective bargaining has
teetered on a single precedent, reflecting an uneasy compromise. Under the
approach established in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,1 public
employers and unions may enter into limited “agency shop” agreements as
a means for unions to recoup their collective bargaining and contractrelated expenses. Unions may charge nonmembers “agency” or “fair share”
fees in “exclusive representation” regimes on the grounds that nonmembers
also obtain the benefits of collective bargaining.2 In contrast, unions are
forbidden from using agency fees to cover expenses incurred to express
their ideological or political views because requiring nonmembers to
subsidize such expressive activities would violate their First Amendment
rights.3 This compromise, hinging on the distinction between collective
bargaining and political activities, has proven to be as divisive as it has
been enduring.4
For decades, the scholarly literature on Abood has generally fallen into
two distinct camps. On one side, critics have lambasted the decision as
inconsistent with First Amendment principles, theorizing that agency fees
compel the expression of nonmembers.5 On the other side, scholars have
defended Abood’s compromise as a justified means of promoting state
government interests in efficient labor relations and preventing “free
riders.”6 As the Supreme Court prepares to consider a direct challenge to
1

431 U.S. 209, 221–22 (1977).
Id. at 222; see also Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 301 (1986); infra
Section I.A (explaining exclusive representation and the exclusive bargaining representative’s status as
representative of all bargaining unit employees).
3
Abood, 431 U.S. at 222, 234–35; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment
commands that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” The Court has read
the word “speech” broadly, frequently using it interchangeably with communicative “expression.”E.g.,
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406–07 (1989). Protection for nonexpressive conduct that facilitates
speech, such as group association and financial contribution rights, is derived from this freedom. E.g.,
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (describing a right of expressive association).
4
Compare Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012) (describing
Abood’s justifications as “something of an anomaly,” but declining to overrule it), with id. at 335
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s characterization of Abood as anomalous, and
describing the lines Abood draws and the balance it strikes as reflective of the Court’s general
evaluation of claims that a condition of public employment violates the First Amendment).
5
See, e.g., Daniel R. Levinson, After Abood: Public Sector Union Security and the Protection of
Individual Public Employee Rights, 27 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1977); Hugh L. Reilly, The Constitutionality
of Labor Unions’ Collection and Use of Forced Dues for Non-Bargaining Purposes, 32 MERCER L.
REV. 561 (1981).
6
See, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional
Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 3, 6 (1983); Matthew Dimick, Labor
Law, New Governance, and the Ghent System, 90 N.C. L. REV. 319, 354 & n.187 (2012) (citing Joe C.
2
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Abood and the agency fees it permits this term in Janus v. AFSCME, these
twin views must be meaningfully revisited.
Both of these traditional camps overlook two key developments. First,
public sector labor statutes and union activity look very different now than
they did four decades ago. Second, First Amendment jurisprudence has
evolved to protect not only familiar conceptions of free speech but also
emerging interests in association and spending. These developments
foreclose any effort to neatly overrule Abood on free speech grounds.
This Article proposes a better way to conceptualize agency fees and a
better way for courts, unions, and reformers to navigate the complex
intersection of public unions and individual expressive rights within an
existing First Amendment framework.7 It suggests that agency fees be
brought into step with current political contribution and campaign finance
jurisprudence by viewing compelled contributions as the mirror image of
contribution restrictions. In this framework, instead of limiting agency fees
to those germane to collective bargaining, courts would limit agency fees
to those reasonably necessary to perform the union’s statutory duties as an
exclusive bargaining representative. Under this “statutory duties”
framework, agency fees subsidizing union activities that arguably infringe
on payers’ rights would be tolerated. But the collective bargaining statute
permitting these activities and agency fees must be “closely drawn” to

Davis & John H. Huston, Right-to-Work Laws and Free Riding, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 52 (1993)); Cynthia
Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 174–75, 186 (2015);
Levinson, supra note 5. The term “free riders” in this context refers to nonunion employees who obtain
the benefits of collective bargaining without incurring its costs. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 225–26; see
also Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2656 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (pointing out that free
ridership creates a uniquely severe “collective action problem” because, with the union required to
negotiate benefits for both employees who pay and those who do not, “not just those who oppose but
those who favor a union have an economic incentive to withhold dues; only altruism or loyalty—as
against financial self-interest—can explain their support”). For more labor relations perspectives on the
relationship between collective bargaining and free riders, see generally KURT L. HANSLOWE ET AL.,
UNION SECURITY IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT: OF FREE RIDING AND FREE ASSOCIATION (1978). For other
perspectives, see also MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (economic
perspective on free riders); Robert Albanese & David D. van Fleet, Rational Behavior in Groups: The
Free-Riding Tendency, 10 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 244 (1985) (organizational theorists’ analysis of free
riders and their impact on group productivity); Gary N. Chaison & Dileep G. Dhavale, The Choice
Between Union Membership and Free-Rider Status, 13 J. LAB. RES. 355 (1992) (empirical analysis of
the overall impact of free riders on labor and industrial relations).
7
This Article assumes the threshold applicability of the First Amendment in public sector agency
fee claims, and limits its exploration of legal alternatives to within the First Amendment’s boundaries. It
resigns itself to the First Amendment’s use because that is what the Supreme Court has done for over
forty years. However, I have reservations as to whether compelled agency fees are expressive enough to
implicate a First Amendment constitutional starting point.
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avoid unnecessary abridgements and match a “sufficiently important
[government] interest.”8
Bringing agency fees in line with campaign finance jurisprudence has
several virtues. It logically tethers the doctrine to other modern First
Amendment principles while still respecting Abood’s foundational
judgment that some forms of public sector agency fees may be
constitutional. Political contribution jurisprudence also fits the agency fee
context because it allows courts to recognize that monetary contributions
can be expressive, without automatically imposing the standard of strict
scrutiny that attends to pure political speech.9 Furthermore, political
contribution jurisprudence is flexible enough to recognize the political tone
of some union activities, while also giving deference to the expertise of
state legislatures that have weighed a host of legitimate interests in crafting
their collective bargaining statutes.
While some of the most persuasive commentators and the current
Court have reviewed agency fees in the public sector through a First
Amendment analysis, their approach either erroneously defines the conduct
of agency fee payments as pure political expression, or as contributions
triggering an “exacting scrutiny” standard of review.10 Once such an
approach is taken, strict or exacting scrutiny dooms the states’ interests,
notwithstanding state legislatures’ efforts to tailor agency fees and
collection procedures to meet government interests in public sector
collective bargaining.11 That the government faces a heightened burden
when it singles out pure political speech is a relatively uncontroversial
principle. But that limited or compelled contributions are permitted the

8
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25
(1976)).
9
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
10
Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 314 (2012); Martin H. Malin, The
Evolving Law of Agency Shop in the Public Sector, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 858–59 (1989); see also
Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2639 (in which the majority appears to endorse Knox’s “exacting scrutiny”
standard, despite professing that “no fine parsing of levels of First Amendment scrutiny is needed” for
the facts of the case).
11
See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting
the strong presumption against constitutionality that accompanies “strict scrutiny” analysis); see also
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444 (“Under exacting scrutiny, the Government may regulate protected
speech only if such regulation promotes a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means to
further the articulated interest.”). “Exacting scrutiny” is merely a linguistic twist on the familiar strict
scrutiny standard, and in practice the two analyses and outcomes are the same. See id. (exacting scrutiny
as implicitly amounting to strict scrutiny); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 724 (2012) (plurality
opinion) (equating “exacting scrutiny” with “most exacting scrutiny” and both with the standard strict
scrutiny test); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66, 68 (describing “exacting scrutiny” as “[t]he strict test,” and
including a discussion of “least restrictive means” in its analysis, a hallmark of the strict scrutiny test).
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same First Amendment freedoms as pure political speech is an anomalous,
and antiquated, feature of agency fee jurisprudence.
This Article’s approach also avoids the strained dichotomy between
ordinary union activities and political expression. When the Court decided
Abood, public sector collective bargaining statutes were still in their
infancy. Because these early statutes resembled the private sector model,
the majority’s belief that one could readily distinguish political and
collective bargaining expenses in both sectors was justified.12 But in
today’s current collective bargaining climate, public union activities are
harder to categorize. Public sector collective bargaining can be political
when it extends to issues of public policy such as classroom size and
teacher tenure. Similarly, political activities like lobbying can relate to
collective bargaining, such as when legislation is proposed for the sole
purpose of limiting the permissible bargaining subjects in public sector
employment.13 Moreover, according to the Court’s dicta in Harris v. Quinn,
even the most quintessentially traditional collective bargaining subject—
wages—can reach important political issues in the public sector,
particularly in an age of ballooning state payrolls and unbalanced budgets.14
Fortunately, states’ collective bargaining laws have evolved into
specifically customized balancing acts of competing interests. Many of
them remove issues of public policy from the scope of public sector
collective bargaining, establish notice and “opt-in/out” agency fee
procedures, and restrain agency fees to a prescribed proportionate amount
in order to limit unnecessary constitutional abridgments.15 Thus, Abood’s
true flaw is that its dated analysis leaves no room for respect and
consideration of modern legislative initiatives concerning public sector
collective bargaining and agency fees.
To be sure, this compelled contribution alternative to agency fee
analysis in the public sector will not fully satisfy either of the original hardline scholarly camps. Fair compromises rarely do. Admittedly, limiting

12

See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 223, 229 (1977).
See id.; see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 522 (1991) (holding that agency
fees may only be used to subsidize lobbying activities within the limited context of facilitating contract
ratification or implementation). Lehnert is a prime example of this strained dichotomy between union
activities and political expression. The product of a badly fractured Court, Lehnert was written by
justices with divergent views as to the political nature (and agency fee chargeability) of six different
categories of union expenditures.
14
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632.
15
E.g., IND. CODE §§ 20-29-6-3 to 20-29-6-4 (2011) (limiting the scope of collective bargaining);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:14A-5.5 (West 2017) (limiting agency fees to a proportionate amount); WASH.
REV. CODE. ANN. § 42.17A.495 (West 2017) (replacing opt-out agency fee requirement with an annual
opt-in requirement); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.91 (West 2017); see also infra Section II.C.
13
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agency fees to cover those expenses reasonably necessary to perform the
statutory duties of an exclusive bargaining representative provides a
narrower set of circumstances than Abood’s germane-to-collectivebargaining rule permits. Conceivably, under this new approach, courts will
look specifically at the language in the collective bargaining statute at issue
and permit agency fees only for bargaining and contract administrative
activities related to the statute’s permissive and mandatory bargaining
subjects. Unions would thus be excluded from charging agency fee payers
for organizing activities, lobbying designed to expand the scope of
collective bargaining, extra-unit litigation pools, and a number of other
union expenses that were once arguably chargeable to agency fee payers
under Abood. However, the current Court insists that all agency fees are
expressive and refuses to grant broad “government-qua-employer” latitude
to states’ determinations that permitting agency fee collection as part of
their collective bargaining statute best manages their public workforce.16
This suggests that, in a future challenge, agency fees used to cover
germane-to-collective-bargaining expenses are already lost. As such,
reimagining Abood through a compelled contribution framework that limits
agency fees to the costs of performing statutory duties certainly paints a
brighter picture than a contra-Abood world that prohibits them entirely.
For some longtime opponents of Abood, the framework proposed here
probably does not go far enough to protect agency fee payers’ First
Amendment rights. Viewing compelled agency fees as significant
infringements on an objector’s expressive interests, these opponents
purport to apply the most stringent forms of judicial scrutiny to all political
expressions including agency fees. Those who advocate for Abood’s
demise purely for First Amendment doctrinal consistency, however, should
find it difficult to reconcile such paramount protections of individual
objecting-payer speech with the expressive rights of unions themselves—
rights that unions logically have after Citizens United v. FEC.17
16
Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2639; see also id. at 2653. The ability to use agency fees to cover these
union expenses, like the rest of the chargeable expenses under the current Abood doctrine, is gone if
Abood is overturned and agency fees in the public sector are held unconstitutional. See Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1968). The
“government-qua-employer” principle refers to the Court’s attempts to place the government in the
same position as private employers when it comes to basic employment matters. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at
2653. Consistent with this notion, the government has broader discretion to restrict an employee’s
words and actions when it acts as employer than when it acts as sovereign. But see id. at 2641 (noting
that the Supreme Court has never “seen Abood as based on Pickering balancing”).
17
558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010); see Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out
Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 802 (2012) (noting that campaign finance laws
have always constrained the political spending of unions and corporations equally). Presumably, when
the Court recognized the political speech rights of corporations under the First Amendment in Citizens
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This Article’s intervention is timely. The Court recently granted
review in Janus v. AFSCME to consider whether to overrule Abood and
invalidate public sector agency fees under the First Amendment.18 Justice
Neil Gorsuch, who replaced Justice Antonin Scalia in April 2017, has
expressed a desire to clarify the level of scrutiny applicable to contribution
limits—and a general awareness of the discontinuity within the Court’s
evolving First Amendment doctrines.19 Thus, reexamining the prevailing
approach to public sector agency fees with the Court’s full complement of
Justices and the added presence of Justice Neil Gorsuch presents an
opportunity to clarify some of the doctrine’s ambiguities, and to bring it in
accord with modern public union activities, statutory frameworks, and First
Amendment principles.
Part I begins this effort by addressing the origins of agency fees and
agency shop agreements in both the public and private sectors of
employment. It starts by discussing the statutes and legislative materials
associated with early collective bargaining in the private sector and
examines the Supreme Court cases attending to agency shop agreements
and fees. It then highlights the Court’s reliance on private sector case
analysis in the public sector agency fee challenge, Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education, and illustrates how this reliance rendered Abood’s First
Amendment analysis incomplete. Furthermore, this Part discusses the
Court’s procedural additions to the workings of Abood several years later in
Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson.20 It concludes with a
discussion of the Court’s most recent decisions on agency fees in order to
highlight the concerns which current Supreme Court Justices have
expressed in trying to reconcile current First Amendment doctrine with
public sector agency fees.
United, it also reinforced the same constitutional rights of unions. See also Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin
Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 1023, 1026–28 (2013) (observing the inconsistency between Citizens United and the line of
agency fee cases, in that Citizens United’s “recent expansion of the rights of corporations to speak over
the objections of dissenting members cannot be squared with Knox’s expansion of the right of dissenters
to restrict union speech”).
18
851 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub nom. Janus v. AFSCME 138 S. Ct. 54 (Sept. 28,
2017) (No. 16-1466) (Illinois state employees asking the Court to overrule Abood on First Amendment
grounds). Like Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016), in which an eightJustice Court deadlocked 4–4, the Janus litigation is funded by the National Right to Work Legal
Defense Fund. Adopting a deliberate litigation strategy, the Janus appellants conceded that Abood is
controlling law in the lower courts, inviting a ruling against them on the basis of the pleadings. This
strategy is used to get cases to the Supreme Court as quickly as possible.
19
E.g., Riddle v. Hickenlooper, 742 F.3d 922, 930 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(confessing “some uncertainty about the level of scrutiny the Supreme Court wishes us to apply to [a]
contribution limit challenge”).
20
475 U.S. 292 (1986).
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Part II examines the historical evolution of public sector unionism
since Abood was decided in 1977. It addresses the push to transplant the
private sector legal model into the public sector and the early premises and
assumptions this push rested on. Part II also expands upon the differences
in private and public sector employment and explains how these
differences have changed in response to evolutions in public sector
collective bargaining and union activities. Finally, Part II explains the most
recent legislative attacks on public sector collective bargaining and public
union responses.
Part III explains the underlying First Amendment principles and
precedents that affect the public sector agency fee doctrine, such as
individual speech and association rights. This Part then argues that after
close examination, the modern precedents and rationales behind most of
these areas of law support a compelled political contribution framework
and standard of review.
Finally, Part IV describes a better alternative to overruling Abood in
Janus: retuning public sector agency fee analysis to the frequencies of
compelled contributions and “closely drawn” scrutiny. Such a retuning
would remove the focus on agency fees as “speech,” or union activities as
“political,” and instead zero in on the state’s collective bargaining statute.
Agency fees would thus represent only a proportionate share of expenses
necessary to perform the duties of an exclusive bargaining agent as defined
in the statute. In describing this trimmed agency fee alternative that tailors
chargeable expenses to the statutory duties, this Article proposes viable
avenues for public unions and legislative bodies to construct an efficient
regulatory scheme, establish a collective bargaining environment, and limit
unnecessary constitutional infringements. These avenues include
nontraditional statutory language, chargeability models, organizational
schemes, and mechanisms for nonmember participation and voice.
I.

THE ORIGINS OF AGENCY FEES IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The sources of agency fee doctrine in both the public and private
employment sectors should be briefly summarized for perspective.
A. Agency Fees in the Private Sector
Federal law governs agency shop agreements and other labor matters
in most industries of private sector employment. As part of the New Deal
initiatives, Congress enacted the first comprehensive federal labor statute,
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the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Wagner Act), in 1935.21
The NLRA sought to promote the rights of workers to unionize, or
designate representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of
bargaining collectively over terms and conditions of employment.22 Under
the NLRA, once employees in a bargaining unit properly certified a labor
organization or representative, employers were required to bargain
collectively with (and only with) the certified representatives of their
employees.23 This duty to bargain collectively encompassed two American
labor law doctrines that remain fundamental: “good faith bargaining” and
“exclusive representation.”24
The doctrine of exclusive representation made it an unfair labor
practice for employers to bargain with employees who were not designated
representatives of a certified union.25 It strengthened the union’s role within
the bargaining process by designating exclusive representation as the sole
path to bargaining, but it also limited individual employees’ rights to enter
into employment agreements themselves.26 Because of this limitation, the
Supreme Court reasoned that exclusive representation creates a duty for the

21
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1935); see also Leon H. Keyserling, The
Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 199, 203 (1960). Other New
Deal legislation included such working improvements as regulating child labor, creating the eight-hour
workday, and establishing the social safety net featuring social security.
22
29 U.S.C. § 151. New Deal law reformers, like President Franklin D. Roosevelt, campaigned on
an economic platform in direct opposition to the “trickle down” approach of prior administrations, and
the NLRA’s promotion of collective bargaining reiterated Roosevelt’s Keynesian policy of investing in
and empowering the working class. Keynesian economics advocates for the expansion of the welfare
state and for the government to step in to assist the economy generally in times of economic depression
by buying things itself. See Gerald Friedman, American Labor and American Law: Exceptionalism and
Its Politics in the Decline of the American Labor Movement, 11 LAW CULTURE & HUMAN. 30, 39
(2015).
23
29 U.S.C. §§ 159(a), 158(a)(5). For union election and certification procedures, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(c).
24
See 29 U.S.C. 158(d) (requiring the parties to “meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment”).The NLRA also states
that once a labor organization is properly selected according to the procedures established within the
Act, that labor union “shall be the exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment.” Id. § 159(a). See also Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive Representation: A
Comparative Inquiry into a “Unique” American Principle, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 47, 47 (1998)
(referring to the principle of exclusive representation as “[t]he fundamental ordering principle which
shapes American labor law and collective bargaining”).
25
See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683–84 (1944). Under the NLRA, to
obtain exclusive representation status, at least a majority of bargaining unit employees during a
certification election must endorse a union. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c).
26
See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944) (“The very purpose of providing by statute
for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms
which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group.”).
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union to negotiate fairly on behalf of all represented employees.27 This duty
of fair representation entitles all represented employees to equal application
of the contract terms for which the union bargained with the employer.28
Since fair representation meant that all covered employees were
presumably benefitting from the union’s services and bargained-for
contract terms, the NLRA allowed for unions and employer contracts to
include union security agreements. The NLRA’s provisions initially
permitted several forms of union security agreements, including “closed
shops” that required represented employees to join and remain members of
the union as a condition of employment and “agency shops” that required
nonmember employees to pay fees to a union for services rendered as their
bargaining representative.29 The Act permitted unions to seek such security
to promote “labor peace” and prevent represented employees from “free
riding,” or benefitting from the union representation afforded to all
employees in a bargaining unit without paying for it.30
Twelve years after the NLRA became law, Congress met to discuss
what it perceived to be a corrective response to some of the Act’s collective
bargaining policies.31 The NLRA’s allowance for all types of union security
agreements had led to allegations of unrestrained union power and abuse,
and amending that allowance was at the top of Congress’s agenda.32 Thus
Congress—inclined to swing the pendulum of power back towards
employers but recognizing the value some form of union security had on
stabilizing the collective bargaining process—passed the Labor

27

Id. at 336.
See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 194, 202–04 (1944). Although in Steele the
Supreme Court applied the duty of fair representation under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), the Court’s
reasoning made clear that the duty applied equally under the NLRA. The Court, without opinion,
confirmed this application to the NLRA. Syres v. Oil Workers International Union, Local No. 23,
350 U.S. 892 (1955); see also Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1926); infra note 34.
29
In addition to closed shops and agency shops, there are several other more obscure types of
agreements made during collective bargaining that fall under the general heading of “union security.”
See CHARLES HANSON ET AL., THE CLOSED SHOP : A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN PUBLIC POLICY AND
TRADE UNION SECURITY IN BRITAIN, THE USA AND WEST GERMANY 121–23 (1982) (defining several
other forms of collective agreements including the “union shop,” the “preferential shop,”
“[m]aintenance of membership,” and “[c]heck-off agreements”).
30
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 762–63 (1961) (discussing decisive past
congressional hearings regarding the cost of exclusive representation and the burden of nonmembers
who participate in the benefits without contribution).
31
See J. Michael Guenther, Note, Labor Law — Union Security — The Agency Shop and State
Right-to-Work Laws, 35 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 547, 547–48 (1960).
32
See id. at 547; see also NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2012). Section 158(a) of the Wagner Act’s
provision that “nothing in this chapter . . . or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an
employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of
employment membership therein” permitted all forms of union security agreements. Id.
28
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Management Relations Act (LMRA or the Taft-Hartley Act) in 1947.33 The
LMRA, among other things, prohibited all forms of union security
agreements except for agency shop agreements.34 Furthermore, § 14(b) of
the LMRA allowed individual states to restrict all forms of union security
agreements, including agency shops, within their own jurisdiction.35
B. Agency Fees and the Private Sector Trilogy of Hanson, Street,
and Allen
The Supreme Court’s first three constitutional challenges related to
agency fees arose in the private sector under the Railway Labor Act (RLA),
prior to public sector employees securing any significant collective
bargaining rights.36 In Railway Employees’ Department v. Hanson, the
Court dismissed a First Amendment association claim, finding no evidence
on the record that requiring employees to finance an exclusive bargaining
representative that engaged in political activities “force[d] men into
ideological and political associations which violate their right to freedom of
33
Pub. L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). Section 8(a)(3)
of the Taft-Hartley Act amended § 8(3) of the Wagner Act, the relevant provision allowing for agency
shop agreements.
34
Id. Taft-Hartley added the following language to the original Section 8(3) proviso:
[t]hat no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a
labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not
available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other
members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or
terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the
initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
Id.; see also Norman L. Cantor, Uses and Abuses of the Agency Shop, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61, 61
n.2 (1983) (“Although the statutory language refers to union ‘membership’ as a condition of
employment, the NLRA has been interpreted to refer to ‘financial core membership’ rather than full
union membership. Thus what appears to be a union shop authorization is actually an agency shop
authorization.”) (citing 601 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1979); Local Union No. 749, Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers
v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 343, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 741–42
(1963); United Stanford Emps. Local 680 v. NLRB; Wine & Liquor Store Emps., Local 122,
261 N.L.R.B. 1070 (1982)).
35
29 U.S.C § 164(b). Eleven states passed laws restricting union security agreements either before
or contemporaneously with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. See Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§ 152 (2012). While the LMRA governs labor relations in most private sector industries, the major
exceptions are the railway and airline industries, which are governed by the RLA. Although the original
RLA was actually enacted in 1926—before the LMRA and the NLRA—for the last seventy years many
of its provisos have been amended to mirror the LMRA and homogenize labor law in all private
industries. Four years after enacting the LMRA, Congress amended the union security provisions in the
RLA to permit agency shop agreements between employers and unions in the railroad industry,
notwithstanding any state law to the contrary. 45 U.S.C. § 152; S. REP. NO . 81-2262, at 1 (1950). The
RLA union security provision was modeled after § 8(a)(3) of the LMRA and is intended to embody
identical constraints. See S. REP. NO. 81-2262, at 1; see also Lykins v. Aluminum Workers Int’l Union,
510 F. Supp. 21, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (refusing to accept a difference between the NLRA’s union security
clause and precedent and the RLA’s).
36
See 45 U.S.C. § 152.
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conscience, freedom of association, and freedom of thought.”37 Hanson
involved employees under a closed shop agreement who simply did not
want to join the union or pay any related dues.38 When it rejected defining
compulsory payments to a union as per se violations of associational
freedoms, the Hanson court did not resolve the free speech implications
that might arise if such collected fees were used for purposes unrelated to
collective bargaining. In declining to decide this issue, the Court noted that
“if the exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover
for forcing ideological conformity . . . this judgment [would] not prejudice
the decision in that case.”39
Five years later, the Court was confronted with the issue Hanson had
reserved in International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street.40 In Street, a group
of Georgia employees claimed that a portion of their compelled union fees
went towards the union’s financing of political causes they opposed, in
violation of their First Amendment speech rights.41 Determined to avoid
answering the constitutional question, a plurality of the Court interpreted
the relevant provisions in the RLA as prohibiting such political uses of fees
because they were completely unrelated to the purpose behind collective
bargaining.42 In his plurality opinion, Justice William Brennan reasoned
37
351 U.S. 225, 236 (1956). Because the record in Hanson provided little detail as to the specific
uses of agency fees, the Court noted that agency fees in this case “is no more an infringement or
impairment of First Amendment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is
required to be a member of an integrated bar.” Id. at 238; see also infra Section III.3.
38
Hanson, 351 U.S. at 227. In addition to a dismissal on First Amendment grounds, the Hanson
Court also dismissed a challenge to agency shop provisions as a violation of the right to work liberty
interest grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 235. In evaluating both the
First Amendment and due process challenges, the Hanson Court first determined that it had jurisdiction
because the RLA’s preemption of state statutes that prohibit agency fee agreements was sufficient state
action to subject the provision of a contract between a private union and a private company to
constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 232 (“If private rights are being invaded, it is by force of an agreement
made pursuant to federal law which expressly declares that state law is superseded. In other words, the
federal statute is the source of power and authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed.”
(citation omitted)); see also Crawford v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l, 870 F.2d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 1989)
(rejecting the argument that subsequent Supreme Court decisions have overruled the finding of state
action in Hanson).
39
Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238.
40
367 U.S. 740 (1961).
41
Id. at 744–45.
42
Id. at 749–50, 768, 770 (“[Section] 2, Eleventh is to be interpreted to deny the unions the power
claimed in this case.”). Although not part of the plurality opinion, four justices in Street did address the
constitutional issue. Justice Harlan joined Justice Frankfurter’s dissent and rejected the First
Amendment claim finding that payments in return for representational services even when used to
promote workers’ interests by political means did not significantly infringe upon fee payers’ rights to
speak, think, and associate as they pleased. Id. at 805–06 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). On the other
hand, Justices Hugo Black and William Douglas, each writing separately, maintained that the use of
compelled fees for political causes seriously violated an objector’s First Amendment freedom to speak,
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that Congress’s purpose in drafting the union security provisions of the
RLA was not to vest “unions with unlimited power to spend exacted
money” but rather to eliminate “free riders” and to equally distribute “the
burden of maintenance by all of the beneficiaries of union activity.”43 Thus,
because “promot[ing] the propagation of political . . . concepts and
ideologies” was outside of the scope of the intended policies behind the
statutory purpose (preventing free riders and ensuring labor peace), union
fees could not be used for this intent over a fee payer’s objection.44
The Court decided in Street that compulsory union fees collected to
support the collective bargaining activities of a union acting as an exclusive
representative do not violate free association rights but that union dues that
are used to support political causes could violate free speech rights. In
doing so, it forced a hard line of permissibility between the two categories
of collected union fees—those made to cover collective bargaining
expenses (agency or fair share fees) and those used for political
expenditures. Justice Brennan went on to acknowledge that there may be
some union activities that do not neatly fit into either of the Court’s
articulated categories.45 The Street Court, however, provided “no view” as
to where the line should be drawn for these expenditures when an
employee objects to subsidizing them with her fees.46 Like its predecessor,
the Street Court willingly left a palpable chasm in its compelled union fees
jurisprudence.
Speaking for the Court two years later in Brotherhood of Railway &
Steamship Clerks v. Allen,47 Justice Brennan reaffirmed his position in
Street that union fee objectors cannot be forced to support political
ideologies. Although decided on procedural grounds, Allen found that the
RLA prohibits unions from using an employee’s fees to support political
think, and support causes of their choice. Id. at 778 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 788 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
43
Id. at 766–68 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). Furthermore, on agency shop fees Justice
Brennan contended:
Its use to support candidates for public office, and advance political programs, is not a use which
helps defray the expenses of the negotiation or administration of collective agreements, or the
expenses entailed in the adjustment of grievances and disputes. In other words, it is a use which
falls clearly outside the reasons advanced by the unions and accepted by Congress why authority
to make unionshop agreements was justified.
Id. at 768.
44
Id. at 744; see id. at 763 (quoting Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 235 (1956)). In
distinguishing political activities from union activities that are germane to collective bargaining, the
Street Court acknowledged that there may be some activities that are both unnecessary to effectuate
collective bargaining and are neither political nor ideological. Id. at 768–69.
45
Id. at 769–70.
46
Id. at 769.
47
373 U.S. 113 (1963).
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causes that the payer opposes and that in the case of opposition the union
bears the burden of providing “a division of the union’s political
expenditures from those germane to collective bargaining.”48 While
handing down this procedural burden to unions, the Allen Court, like the
Street Court before it, also reasserted the validity of objectors being
compelled to pay agency fees for collective bargaining purposes.49
Although incomplete, the Hanson, Street, and Allen trilogy provided
the foundational doctrine for agency shop agreements and fees in the
private sector. They established for purposes of future analysis that union
expenditures fall into three categories: (1) those germane to collective
bargaining, (2) those made in support of political causes and activities, and
(3) all other expenses that fall into neither of the above categories. Because
they support the government’s purpose behind union security provisions
allowing agency shop agreements, expenses in the first category are
chargeable to an objecting fee payer. Expenses within the second category
are not. Finally, the cases establish that it is the union’s responsibility to
determine which part of their expenditures are chargeable as agency fees—
a complex determination because many union activities may not neatly fit
into the first two categories.
C. Agency Fees in the Public Sector
When Congress enacted the NLRA and the LMRA, it exempted
public employers such as government agencies from coverage. Early
adversaries to collective bargaining in the public sector based their
opposition on a belief that such allowances were in conflict with existing
civil services laws or, at the very least, unnecessary due to the protections
they already afforded.50 Others opposed granting bargaining rights to public
servants, believing that doing so would inevitably lead to future strikes that
would endanger the public.51 Even lauded social democrat President
48
Id. at 121. The Allen Court places this burden on the union mainly for practical reasons,
contending that “[s]ince the unions possess the facts and records from which the proportion of political
to total union expenditures can reasonably be calculated, basic considerations of fairness compel that
they, not the individual employees, bear the burden of proving such proportion.” Id. at 122.
49
Id. at 121–22. Because the record in Allen was insufficient to determine what portion of the
objector employees’ fees were being used to finance political activities, the Court remanded the case,
instructing the lower court to determine: “(1) what expenditures disclosed by the record are political; (2)
what percentage of total union expenditures are political expenditures.” Id. at 121.
50
See Joel M. Douglas, State Civil Service and Collective Bargaining: Systems in Conflict, 52 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 162, 163–64 (1992); David Lewin & Raymond D. Horton, The Impact of Collective
Bargaining on the Merit System in Government, 30 ARB. J. 199, 200–01 (1975).
51
See Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369, 1376 (2009)
(noting that the threat of strike was behind several early court decisions against public sector employer
collective bargaining, despite the union’s recognition that strikes were not permissible).
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Roosevelt opposed strikes related to public sector collective bargaining,
fearing chaos if employees responsible for performing public health and
safety services, such as police and firefighters, ever went on strike.52 Other
opponents thought that merely the fear of a public employee strike would
be exploited by public employees at the bargaining table in order to win
excessive economic concessions.53 Still others saw the NLRA as ripe for
constitutional challenge and refrained from the public sector collective
bargaining discussion until the issue was fully resolved in the private
sector.54
Sentiments changed, however, in the three decades that followed,
when public sector employment increased fourfold in the United States,
52
Letter from Franklin Roosevelt, President, United States, to Luther C. Steward, President, Nat’l
Fed’n of Fed. Emps. (Aug. 16, 1937), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15445
[https://perma.cc/FB32-BYH6]. But see MYRON LIEBERMAN, PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING 29 (1980)
(noting that “the word ‘essential’ was used without qualifications” to define all public employees, and
that some government services “are hardly essential to public health and safety”).
53
See Russell A. Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment Labor
Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MICH. L. REV. 891, 892–94 (1969); see also KURT L.
HANSLOWE, THE EMERGING LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 11–20 (1967) (“To
the extent that collective bargaining entails joint determination of conditions of employment, such
bargaining with the government is seen as unavoidably creating an interference in the sovereign’s
affairs.”). See generally Charles M. Rehmus, Labor Relations in the Public Sector in the United States,
109 INT’L LAB. REV. 199 (1974). Other practical considerations may have also delayed public sector
unionization. Public sector employees prior to the 1960s “were not generally dissatisfied with their
terms and conditions of employment and therefore, except in isolated cases, did not press for collective
bargaining rights” before then. Id. at 202. Moreover, prior to the 1960s, private sector unions and their
international federations were probably fully occupied in trying to increase the extent of organization in
the private sector. Id. Only after union membership in the private sector began to decrease did these
private sector international unions begin to see the large and growing number of public sector
employees as a fertile alternative. Id.
54
See generally JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE
LAW AND THE STATE, 1900–1962 (2004). Responses to early twentieth century attempts to secure
bargaining rights in the public sector suggest that a majority of the public also opposed it. In September
of 1919, nine people were killed and hundreds more were injured when the city was left lawless for
three days after over 70% of Boston’s police force went on strike. Joseph Slater, Labor and the Boston
Police Strike of 1919, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STRIKES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 241, 246–47 (Aaron
Brenner et al. eds., 2009). Before the strike, Boston police officers worked regular weeks of between
seventy-three hours and ninety-eight hours and were sometimes required to remain on duty for
seventeen hours straight. Id. at 246. Following the strike, Massachusetts’ then-obscure governor, Calvin
Coolidge, fired all 1,147 of the striking officers and denounced their behavior. Id. at 241. His hard
stance was applauded by the media and Boston civilians—who collected $471,758 to pay state guards
until replacements were found—and thrust Coolidge into the political spotlight. Id. at 250. By 1923,
Calvin Coolidge was the thirtieth President of the United States. Francis Russell, The Strike That Made
a President, 14 AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1963, http://www.americanheritage.com/content/strike-madepresident [https://perma.cc/WPD8-4NNE]. Unfortunately for public sector unions, courts and officials
opposing public sector unionism sometimes cited the Boston Strike as a cautionary tale through the end
of the 1940s. See Joseph E. Slater, The Court Does Not Know “What a Labor Union Is”: How State
Structures and Judicial (Mis)constructions Deformed Public Sector Labor Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 981,
1010, 1013 (2000).
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outpacing employment growth in the private sector.55 As public employees
grew in number and the NLRA’s Supreme Court successes renewed
confidence in the collective bargaining process, several state legislatures
enacted laws granting limited bargaining rights to public employees
beginning in the late 1950s.56 While most of these statutes resembled the
private sector collective bargaining structure of the LMRA and adopted
similar union security language, others chose to codify their more
restrictive policies on union security agreements as permitted under Section
14(b) of the LMRA.57 The result was a piecemeal collection of state
legislation governing collective bargaining between state and local
governments and their employees.
1.

The Court’s Application of Private Sector Agency Fee Doctrine to
the Public Sector: Abood v. Detroit Board of Education
Following its private sector decision in Allen, the Court was silent on
agency fees for nearly fifteen years. During these years, significant
collective bargaining rights arrived in the public sector for the first time.58

55

See Developments in the Law—Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1614–15 (1984).
See id.; see also Project, Collective Bargaining and Politics in Public Employment, 19 UCLA L.
REV. 887, 893 (1972). Wisconsin enacted the first state public sector bargaining law in 1959 with
Minnesota quick to follow. Developments in the Law, supra note 55, at 1678. Thirty additional states
followed suit during the 1960s and 1970s. Id. at 1679. President John F. Kennedy followed the states’
trend and granted bargaining rights to federal employees in 1962 by signing Executive Order 10988.
Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. § 521 (1962). Earlier federal legislation like the Lloyd-LaFollette Act
of 1912 provided some formal protections for federal agency employees. Lloyd-LaFollette Act, ch. 389,
§ 6, 37 Stat. 555 (1912) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7511 (2012)). The Lloyd-LaFollette Act, for example,
provided essentially a “just cause” termination requirement, but there were no significant appellate
rights for a decisionmaker’s just cause decision. See Veterans Preference Act, ch. 287, § 8, 58 Stat. 389
(1944) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2108 (2012)) (providing veterans who enter into public service
employment the right to challenge adverse personnel actions). It was no coincidence that Wisconsin
was the first state to pass legislation granting collective bargaining rights to public employees. See Mari
Jo Buhle, The Wisconsin Idea, IN IT STARTED IN WISCONSIN: DISPATCHES FROM THE FRONT LINES OF
THE NEW LABOR PROTEST 14 (Mari Jo Buhle & Paul Buhle eds., 2011); Paul Buhle & Frank
Empsak, Labor, Social Solidarity, and the Wisconsin Winter, in IT STARTED IN WISCONSIN, supra,
at 101–03; Roger Bybee, The Role of Corporations, in IT STARTED IN WISCONSIN, supra, at 139. In
1932, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)—now the
largest union of public employees in the United States—was first established as a public employee
association by a small group of professional state employees in Madison, Wisconsin. Buhle &
Empsak, supra, at 101–02.
57
See HANSON ET AL., supra note 29, at 143–45.
58
See Joseph Slater, The Strangely Unsettled State of Public-Sector Labor in the Past Thirty Years,
30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 511 (2013). In 1956, the first year for which statistics on membership in
public sector unions were kept, there were 915,000 union members in the public sector. By 1978, public
sector membership had grown by 296% to 3,625,000. Myron Lieberman, Teacher Bargaining: An
Autopsy, 63 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 231, 232 tbl.1 (1981).
56
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Moreover, during this period the Court also settled important First
Amendment principles relating to financial contributions.59
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of agency
shop agreements in the public sector in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education.60 In Abood, a group of teachers objected to the payment of
agency fees under a collective bargaining agreement entered into between
the Detroit Board of Education and their union representative.61 The
petitioners argued first that Hanson and Street did not apply because
agency fees in the public sector, and not just those utilized for political
purposes, required a different First Amendment consideration than their
private sector counterparts.62 Second, they argued that even under the
Hanson and Street analysis, union costs for collective bargaining cannot be
charged to agency fee payers because “public sector collective bargaining
itself is inherently political.”63
Writing for the majority in Abood, Justice Potter Stewart began by
rejecting the petitioner’s First Amendment public–private distinction to
employment and collective bargaining. Justice Stewart reasoned that,
although there may be “very real differences” between public and private
collective bargaining, these differences are related to the special character
of the employer and not the employees.64 Thus, these differences “are not
such as to work any greater infringement upon the First Amendment
interests of public employees.”65 According to Justice Stewart, “[p]ublic
employees [were] not basically different from private employees; on the
whole, they have the same sort of skills, the same needs, and seek the same
advantages.”66
With the argument for a private–public distinction disposed of, Justice
Stewart then applied the agency fee analysis outlined in Hanson and Street.
59

See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
61
Id. at 212–13. The Detroit Federation of Teachers was certified as the exclusive representative of
teachers employed by the Detroit Board of Education in 1967 following a secret ballot election. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 432.211 (1979) (extending some bargaining rights to public employees). The
Court noted in Abood that “although not identical in every respect,” Michigan’s agency shop provisions
were “broadly modeled after federal law.” Abood, 431 U.S. at 223 (citing Rockwell v. Bd. of Educ.,
227 N.W.2d 736, 744–45 (Mich. 1975); Mich. Emp’t Relations Comm’n v. Reeths–Puffer Sch. Dist.,
215 N.W.2d 672, 675 & n.11 (Mich. 1974); Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Detroit,
214 N.W.2d 803, 807–08 (Mich. 1974)).
62
Abood, 431 U.S. at 213–14; see also Brief for Appellants at 189–96, Abood, 431 U.S. 209 (No.
75-1153), 1976 WL 181666.
63
Abood, 431 U.S. at 227 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64
Id. at 230.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 229–30.
60
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He began by adopting the same government interests supporting agency
fees in the private sector to Abood, noting that “[t]he desirability of labor
peace is no less important in the public sector, nor is the risk of ‘free riders’
any smaller.”67 Justice Stewart’s analysis, however, deviated from Hanson
and Street as to how these interests impacted First Amendment rights.
Hanson and Street recognized these government interests in deciding that
agency fees used for collective bargaining purposes do not infringe upon an
agency fee payer’s association rights.68 In Hanson and Street, the Court
found that agency fees compelled a payment in exchange for the union’s
collective bargaining services and likened this to other governmentcompelled fees in exchange for goods or services.69 Therefore, Hanson and
Street saw no compelled association in agency fees because the required
agency fee payment was not likely to result in identifying the agency fee
payer with the union.70 Abood, however, stated that compelled financial
support of a union might infringe upon an individual’s First Amendment
association rights but that such an infringement is justified to promote
government interests.71
Although the Abood Court was unclear as to its reasons behind
adopting this alternative, its reliance on Buckley v. Valeo is instructive.72
Decided just one year prior to Abood, Buckley dealt with the constitutional
validity of a federal law limiting campaign contributions.73 After a
complicated and lengthy analysis, Buckley held that limiting contributions
“inpinge[s] on protected associational freedoms.”74 The Abood Court—
reasoning that compelling contributions is no less of an infringement than
restricting them—cited Buckley for its proposition that “contributing to an
organization for the purpose of spreading a political message is protected
by the First Amendment.”75 Thus, Abood may have attempted to reconcile
Buckley’s somewhat “incomprehensible” analysis and new holding that

67

Id. at 224.
See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 770 (1961); Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson,
351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
69
See Street, 367 U.S. at 768; Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238; see also supra Section I.B.
70
Street, 367 U.S. at 767–68; Hanson, 351 U.S. at 236–38.
71
Abood, 431 U.S. at 226–27 (1977) (reasoning that requiring a public employee to subsidize
collective bargaining “might well be thought . . . to interfere in some way with an employee’s freedom
to associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so”).
72
See id. at 234 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (per curiam)).
73
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
74
Id. at 22; see also JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 149 (2012) (contending that Buckley v. Valeo “has gone down in history as one of the Supreme
Court’s most complicated, contradictory, incomprehensible (and longest) opinions”).
75
Abood, 431 U.S. at 234.
68
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contributions implicate the First Amendment with the settled agency fee
precedent of Hanson and Street.76
After upholding the initial validity of agency fees in the public sector
context, Abood then went on to consider their validity when used to
promote political or ideological activities.77 Relying heavily on its analysis
in Hanson and Street, the Court unanimously held that the First
Amendment prohibits the Government from “requiring any [objecting
nonmember] to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may
oppose.”78
Indeed, after Abood, agency fee doctrine in the public and private
sector had drawn the same bright line and reached parallel compromises
but through different routes.79 Union activities germane to collective
bargaining were chargeable to objecting agency fee payers, and political
activities were not. The only relevant distinction a majority of the Court
acknowledged between public and private sector unions in Abood was that
the line between political activities and activities germane to collective
bargaining “may be somewhat hazier” in the public sector.80 However, the
Abood Court declined to elaborate further as to which specific hazy union
activities could be financed with an objector’s agency fees.81
2. Criticisms of Abood
Scholars have been writing on Abood’s shortcomings since it was
decided, but for this Article, two lines of criticism are particularly relevant.
First, some commentators criticize Abood’s failure to distinguish between
public and private sector collective bargaining before deviating from the
private sector agency fee precedent articulated in Hanson and Street.82
Although Justices John Paul Stevens, William Rehnquist, and Lewis
Powell all wrote separately in Abood, only Justice Powell saw the public
sector and private sector union distinction as “fundamental,” noting that
unlike their private sector counterparts:
76

See infra Part III.
431 U.S. at 232–37.
78
Id. at 235.
79
Estlund, supra note 6, at 184.
80
Abood, 431 U.S. at 236.
81
Id.
82
See, e.g., Andrew Buttaro, Stalemate at the Supreme Court: Friedrichs v. California Teachers
Association, Public Unions, and Free Speech, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 341, 346–47 (2016). For a
discussion of the differences between public and private sector collective bargaining generally, see, for
example, HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 22 (1971);
Clyde Summers, Bargaining in the Government’s Business: Principles and Politics, 18 U. TOL. L. REV.
265, 265 (1987); Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE
L.J. 1156, 1157 (1974).
77
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[P]ublic-sector union activities—including collective bargaining—have an
inherently political cast. Indeed, a public-sector union functions much like a
political party, as the ultimate objective of both “is to influence public
decisionmaking in accordance with the views and perceived interests of its
membership.”83

Although enlightened in his recognition of how collective bargaining
activities could inherit a political tone in the public sector, Justice Powell
and his accompanying intellectuals’ casting of all public sector collective
bargaining activities as inherently political is as shortsighted as Abood’s
majority opinion. The true nature of collective bargaining activities in the
public sector is that they are transient and context specific, which is why
only a case-by-case balancing properly evaluates their activities and
supporting agency fee payments.84
A second line of criticism maintains that Abood’s interpretation of all
agency fees as constitutional infringements is incomplete without a proper
scrutiny of the state’s interests.85 If laws permitting agency fees infringe on
a payer’s association rights, First Amendment jurisprudence requires that a
court only sustain that action’s constitutionality if it can say, subject to
“exacting scrutiny,” that the state has shown a compelling interest in
imposing the fee.86 Furthermore, the action must be narrowly tailored so
that the infringement is no greater than that which is necessary to advance
the state’s compelling interest.87
Justice Stewart did not subject the agency fee to this type of analysis
in Abood.88 Instead Justice Stewart, limited by the lack of a developed
record on which to scrutinize the Detroit Board of Education’s claims and
narrowly tailor the agency fees, simply deferred to the Michigan
legislature’s judgment that the agency shop provision promotes stable labor
relations by preventing employees who are not union members from
enjoying the benefits of collective bargaining without contributing to the
costs of representation. Even assuming that the State’s interests were
compelling, Justice Stewart did not scrutinize the relationship between that

83

Buttaro, supra note 82, at 348 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 250 (Powell, J., concurring)).
See infra Section II(B) & Section II(C).
85
See Malin, supra note 10, at 859.
86
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64; see also, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
87
Id.
88
See generally Abood, 431 U.S. 209. Indeed, strangely, up until recently, no one on the Court had
tried to articulate the standard of review in agency fee cases.
84
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interest and the agency shop provisions, and his efforts to tailor the agency
fees are nonexistent.89
3. Hudson and Beyond: Making Abood Work in the Public Sector
Several years after Abood, the Court articulated a practical addition to
Abood’s public sector analysis in Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v.
Hudson.90 In Hudson, the Court held that a public sector “[u]nion should
not be permitted to exact a service fee from nonmembers without first
establishing a procedure which will avoid the risk that their funds will be
used, even temporarily, to finance ideological activities unrelated to
collective bargaining.”91 These “Hudson procedures” require public sector
unions to provide annual “Hudson notices” to nonmembers, notifying them
of their right to object to paying fees for nonchargeable expenses.92 The
Court also required that Hudson notices provide nonmembers with “an
adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt
opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial
decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while
such challenges are pending.”93 In other words, Hudson held that the
procedural ability of nonmembers to review union expenditures and “opt
out” of paying nonchargeable expenses was constitutionally required under
the First Amendment.
Five years later, in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, the Court
addressed one of the “somewhat hazier” union activities Abood alluded to
and held that a union could not charge objecting employees for lobbying
expenses.94 Both the Hudson and Lehnert Courts, however, wholeheartedly
adopted Abood’s fundamental holding that agency fees were permissible in
the public sector context. Justice Scalia’s concurring and dissenting opinion
in Lehnert is noteworthy, however. In it, he appears to adopt a First
Amendment analysis and a level of scrutiny similar to the standard this
Article advocates: permitting agency fee payments only to the extent that
they are reasonably necessary to perform the state-mandated duties of an

89
Although Justice Stewart’s failure to scrutinize the contribution of the agency shop to stable
labor relations might be explained by the procedural posture of the case, he could have at least directed
the lower court on remand to develop a record on which to scrutinize the state’s claims and narrowly
tailor the agency fees. See Malin, supra note 10, at 860–61.
90
475 U.S. 292 (1986).
91
Id. at 305 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 244 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
92
See id. at 310.
93
Id.
94
500 U.S. 507, 518 (1991) (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 236); see also id. at 524 (“The union
surely may not, for example, charge objecting employees for a direct donation or interest-free loan to an
unrelated bargaining unit for the purpose of promoting employee rights or unionism generally.”).
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exclusive representative; in other words, to act on the compelling state
interest using the tools the government has designated within the statute.95
4.

The Court’s Move Away from Abood: Not on Its “[T]op-[T]en
[L]ist of [F]avorite [P]recedents”96
While Hudson and Lehnert represent decades where the Court applied
Abood as controlling precedent, two more recent cases involving agency
fees demonstrate the Court’s present inclination to question Abood’s First
Amendment analysis and holding.97 In 2012, the Court in Knox v. Service
Employees International Union, Local 1000 held that a union must send a
new Hudson notice to represented employees if, during the year, union
dues for members and the proportionate agency fee assessment for
nonmembers changes due to additional political expenses that were not
disclosed in the original notice.98
Knox involved a California union that had increased its union dues by
25% in order to defeat unanticipated ballot measures during a special
election after Hudson notices were sent and the objection period had
passed.99 While holding that the union violated the First Amendment by not
sending a new Hudson notice, Justice Samuel Alito first reaffirmed that
95

See id. at 558–59, 562 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2652–53 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
97
See infra Part III. The Court’s inclination reflects the notable doctrinal changes to the First
Amendment that have occurred over the past two decades. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310, 371–72 (2010) (reasoning that because political spending is a form of protected speech under the
First Amendment, the government may not limit individuals from spending as much money as they
want on political elections); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (explaining the
First Amendment’s freedom of speech to include a complementary freedom not to speak). For an
argument that the contemporary Court’s rethinking of free speech is best understood as a reaction to the
Burger Court’s retrenchment from the expansive conception of free speech embraced by the Warren
Court, see generally Keith Werhan, The Liberalization of Freedom of Speech on a Conservative Court,
80 IOWA L. REV. 51 (1994).
98
567 U.S. 298, 322 (2012). Knox followed a political shift in California, after longtime Governor
Gray Davis was replaced with Arnold Schwarzenegger in 2003. Schwarzenegger’s fiscal reforms
included ballot measures that required teachers to work longer before tenure eligibility and restricted
political spending by public employee unions. See Steven Malanga, The Beholden State: How PublicSector Unions Broke California, CITY J. 18 (Spring 2010), https://www.city-journal.org/html/beholdenstate-13274.html [https://perma.cc/V4JK-GLQP]; see also BRIAN P. J ANISKEE & KEN MASUGI,
DEMOCRACY IN CALIFORNIA: POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE GOLDEN STATE 93 (2nd ed. 2008).
The SEIU’s increased agency fees went to combating the objectionable ballot measures. The SEIU
spent $20 million campaigning against the measures, with the California Teachers Association (CTA)
contributing an additional $53 million. Mark Brenner, California Nurses Lead the Fight Against Arnold
Schwarzenegger’s
Anti-Union
Ballot
Measures,
LAB.
NOTES
(Feb.
18,
2006),
http://www.labornotes.org/2006/02/california-nurses-lead-fight-against-arnold-schwarzeneggers-antihttps://www.facebook.com/messages/t/24607605union-ballot-measures
[https://perma.cc/GA4LBLTQ]. Schwarzenegger’s four ballot initiatives lost overwhelmingly. See J ANISKEE & MASUGI, supra,
at 93.
99
567 U.S. at 304.
96
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agency fees represent a “significant impingement on First Amendment
rights.”100 Although he declined to revisit the propriety of this infringement
in Knox, Justice Alito did go on to express the belief that some public
sector collective bargaining is political. In doing so, he noted that: “a
public-sector union takes many positions during collective bargaining that
have powerful political and civic consequences,” positions with which
nonmembers may disagree.101 The Knox decision went on to explicitly
rebuke the Abood Court’s assumption without any “focused analysis” that
public and private sector agency shop agreements are the same102 and to
question the free-rider justification, calling it “generally insufficient to
overcome First Amendment objections,” and “something of an anomaly.”103
The Court admonished Abood even further two years later in Harris v.
Quinn. In Harris, the Court held that home healthcare professionals, jointly
employed by both the State of Illinois and individuals, were not required to
pay agency fees.104 Justice Alito again asserted that Abood wrongly applied
the private sector agency shop analysis to the public sector, noting that
“[t]he Abood Court seriously erred in treating Hanson and Street as having
all but decided the constitutionality of compulsory payments to a publicsector union.”105 According to Justice Alito:
Abood failed to appreciate the difference between the core union speech
involuntarily subsidized by dissenting public-sector employees and the core
union speech involuntarily funded by their counterparts in the private sector.
In the public sector, core issues such as wages, pensions, and benefits are
important political issues, but that is generally not so in the private sector. In
the years since Abood, as state and local expenditures on employee wages and
benefits have mushroomed, the importance of the difference between
bargaining in the public and private sectors has been driven home.106

Unimpressed by Abood’s holding and “questionable foundations,” the
Harris Court refused to expand Abood to home healthcare workers who
were not full-fledged government employees.107 However, by
distinguishing home healthcare workers as beyond Abood’s purview, the

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
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Id. at 310–11 (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455 (1984)).
Id. at 310 (citation omitted).
Id. at 313.
Id.
134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644–45 (2014).
Id. at 2632.
Id.
Id. at 2638.
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Court avoided the petitioners’ request to expressly overrule it.108 Justices
Elena Kagan, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor
dissented from the majority’s “potshots at Abood” in Harris.109 Justice
Kagan vigorously defended the precedent, writing that “[f]or some 40
years, Abood has struck a stable balance—consistent with this Court’s
general framework for assessing public employees’ First Amendment
claims—between those employees’ rights and government entities’
interests in managing their workforces.”110 In spite of her efforts, the
majority’s intentions appeared inevitable. Although Abood had been
reluctantly pardoned by the Court, after Harris it survived only on death
row.
Recognizing their close proximity to victory, opponents to agency fees
quickly brought another case in 2015, but with the Court shorthanded after
the death of Justice Scalia, Friedrichs v. California Teachers’ Ass’n
resulted in a 4–4 per curiam decision.111 Undeterred, and hoping the Court
would again take up the issue when restored to its full complement of
Justices, agency fee opponents immediately began funding subsequent
cases in the lower courts.112 In April 2017, Justice Gorsuch succeeded
Justice Scalia,113 and five months later, the Supreme Court agreed to hear
Janus v. AFSCME—its fourth agency fee case in five years.114

108
Id. at 2638 n.19. But see id. at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court’s refusal to
overrule Abood is “cause for satisfaction, though hardly applause”).
109
Id. at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
110
Id. at 2658. Moreover, her dissent sniffed out the right-wing political objective behind the
majority’s opinion in Harris and the circumstances surrounding it:

For many decades, Americans have debated the pros and cons of right-to-work laws and fairshare requirements. All across the country and continuing to the present day, citizens have
engaged in passionate argument about the issue and have made disparate policy choices. The
petitioners in this case asked this Court to end that discussion for the entire public sector, by
overruling Abood and thus imposing a right-to-work regime for all government employees. The
good news out of this case is clear: The majority declined that radical request. The Court did
not, as the petitioners wanted, deprive every state and local government, in the management of
their employees and programs, of the tool that many have thought necessary and appropriate to
make collective bargaining work.
Id.
111

136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam).
See Moshe Z. Marvit, Labor Opponents Already Have the Next ‘Friedrichs’ SCOTUS Case
Ready to Go Under Trump, IN THESE TIMES, Jan. 4, 2017, available at
http://inthesetimes.com/working/en
Try/19776/will_trumps_supreme_court_reverse_fair_share_fees_unions_foes_hope_so
[https://perma.cc/2VY3-69LF].
113
Id.
114
Id.
112
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II. NONJUDICIAL CHANGES TO PUBLIC UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN THE YEARS SINCE ABOOD
Abood arrived at the Supreme Court when public sector labor statutes
and collective bargaining were still in their infancy.115 Once a state enacted
collective bargaining legislation, public sector employee associations were
usually absorbed into existing private sector labor unions.116 A powerful
force in the 1950s economy, these unions came to see the growing number
of public employees as the solution to their steady private membership
decline and aggressively sought to represent public sector employees.117

115
See Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2012)).
116
See Richard W. Hurd & Sharon Pinnock, Public Sector Unions: Will They Thrive or Struggle to
Survive?, 25 J. LAB. RES. 211, 214–20 (2004). While most public sector employees were absorbed into
existing unions, a few professional associations from the public sector successfully evolved into union
representatives and have remained independent. The National Education Association (NEA) and the
Fraternal Order of Police are the most prominent examples of professional associations that adopted
union tactics and collective bargaining in order to retain their independent status. AFSCME and SEIU
were the two most successful unions at absorbing past professional associations in the public sector.
Largely because of their success in absorbing smaller associations, AFSCME and SEIU were also the
two fastest growing unions during the 1970s and 1980s. See Leo Troy, Are Municipal Collective
Bargaining and Municipal Governance Compatible?, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 453, 482 (2003).
Teamsters and the Communication Workers of America were also able to absorb some professional
associations but with less success. See City of Escanaba v. Mich. Labor Mediation Bd., 172 N.W.2d
836, 841 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969); State ex rel. Missey v. Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 42 (Mo. 1969) (holding
that without a statutory provision to the contrary, public employees may join unions affiliated with
national union organizations or unions that have private employees as members); Levasseur v.
Wheeldon, 112 N.W.2d 894, 898 (S.D. 1962).
117
See DONALD H. WOLLETT ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 7 (4th
ed. 1993). After the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) became affiliated with the United
Autoworkers (UAW) and the AFL-CIO, the groups began an aggressive initiative in 1961 to win the
representative status of public school teachers in major cities. Despite the NEA having more
professional members, the resources and organizational activities of the AFT and its traditionally
private union affiliates proved immensely successful because the AFT beat out the NEA for
representational rights in the New York, Chicago, Baltimore, District of Columbia, Philadelphia, and
Boston city school systems. Id. at 7–8.
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A. The Early Differences Between Private and Public Employment and
Collective Bargaining: “[A] [V]ery [F]at [M]an [S]tuffed into a [L]ittle
Lord Fauntleroy [S]uit”118
The successful incorporation of public sector employees into the
traditionally private union model relied on the perception that public
employees were in fact not discernible from their private counterparts.119
And in a broad employment sense this was true, in that both public and
private employees were concerned with fair wages and benefits,
recognition, the redress of wrongs, and decent working conditions.120
Because of these similarities, union leaders argued that the private sector
model of collective bargaining—which involved good faith negotiations of
wages and working conditions, a mutually binding contract for a specific
duration, exclusive representation, and an agreement to share responsibility
for administering the provisions of that contract—was also the most
effective means of handling labor relations in the public sector.121 There
were, however, important differences between the two as they related to
public policy, leverage during negotiations, and individual guarantees of
the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment.122
First, the principal goals of government employees were politically
determined, as opposed to private sector objectives that were economically
driven.123 These politically determined goals, like politics itself, tended to
118

HERBERT L. HABER, PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE HELD BY THE INSTITUTE OF
MANAGEMENT & LABOR RELATIONS 7–10 (1968) (discussing the relevance of private sector experience
to public sector bargaining). Herbert L. Haber was City Director of Labor Relations, New York, New
York, from 1966–1973. During a conference held by the Institute of Management and Labor Relations
in 1968, Haber made this early observation when explaining the many differences between the private
and public sectors of employment and why such differences meant that the rules for collective
bargaining in the private sector could not be simply draped over the public sector without “extensive
tailoring.” Id. at 10. To simply try and do so “recalls the cartoons I’m sure all of you have seen of the
little boy wearing his daddy’s coat, or of a very fat man stuffed into a little Lord Fauntleroy suit.” Id.
The author has tried and failed to locate any of these illustrious cartoons and fears they may have been
lost to time.
119
Id. at 7–10.
120
Id. at 8.
121
See Jungin Kim, The Role of Public-Sector Unions During Privatization, 25 KOREAN J. POL’Y
STUD. 23, 26 (2010).
122
See Local Distress, State Surpluses, Proposition 13: Prelude to Fiscal Crisis or New
Opportunities?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the City of the H. Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 397–98 (1978) [hereinafter Fosler] (statement of R. Scott Fosler, Director,
Government Studies of the Committee for Economic Development); see also Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 149–52 (1983); Staughton Lynd, Employee Speech in the Private and Public Workplace:
Two Doctrines or One, 1 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 711 (1977). See generally Gerald E. Frug, Does
the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 942 (1976)
(discussing the due process requirements for public employees).
123
See Fosler, supra note 122, at 400; see also THOM REILLY, RETHINKING PUBLIC SECTOR
COMPENSATION: WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST? 68 (2012).
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be more numerous and intangible than goals in private business.124
Moreover, because employees in the public sector were not concerned with
competition or profits, few market constraints limited their demands.125
Mandatory taxes funded government operations, so the government did not
need to hold the price of its operations down to attract customers.126
Another important distinction between the public and private
employment sector related to the hierarchal structure and authority within
employment.127 Employees in the public sector actively participated in the
selection of their employers, the elected officials, whereas private sector
unions did not. Moreover, a distinct authoritative structure in the private
sector made it easier to identify who was on the other side of the bargaining
table. In the private sector, the union actively bargained against private
business owners, the interests of shareholders, and management, whereas in
the public sector, bargaining sides were more obscure. Elected officials did
not profit from favorable concessions, and ultimately the interests of
taxpayers (some of whom were also public employees and union members)
were impacted by the results.128 Furthermore, scholars early on recognized
the potential “two bites at the apple” advantage exclusive to public sector
bargaining employees, where unions could attempt by lobbying to secure
from elected officials and the legislature that which they failed to obtain at
the bargaining table.129
124

Fosler, supra note 122, at 400.
See REILLY, supra note 123, at 68 (noting that private sector unions know to mitigate their
demands, or not to “give away the farm” because their employers could go out of business; public
unions have no such incentive because their industry is not driven by market discipline); see also Harry
C. Katz et al., Crisis and Recovery in the U.S. Auto Industry: Tumultuous Times for a Collective
Bargaining Pacesetter, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER DURESS : CASE STUDIES OF MAJOR U.S.
INDUSTRIES 46, 75–77 (Howard R. Stranger et al. eds., 2013). The UAW, a private union known
historically as a highly centralized and militant organization that had successfully negotiated generous
benefits in the past, agreed to large concessions in 2007 and even more in 2009 during the General
Motors and Chrysler bankruptcies to help the companies stay afloat. James Sherk, How Collective
Bargaining Affects Government Compensation and Total Spending, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 22, 2015),
http://www.heritage.org/testimony/how-collective-bargaining-affects-government-compensation-andtotal-spending [https://perma.cc/MVD8-5N3A].
126
See Fosler, supra note 122, at 401. The states’ monopolies on essential services give
government unions “tremendous leverage to force concessions.” REILLY, supra note 123, at 68.
127
See Fosler, supra note 122, at 401.
128
Id.; see also REILLY, supra note 123, at 68.
129
See HABER, supra note 118, at 9–10. This concept is also referred to in scholarship as “‘end
run’ or ‘double-deck’ bargaining.” Id. at 9; see also Michael H. Gottesman, Wellington’s Labors,
45 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 77, 81 (2001). The concern that public labor unions would take “two bites at
the apple” were valid. At the state level especially, public labor unions have successfully used their
political lobby to influence public sector employment legislation. Up until quite recently, politicians
that refused their demands often faced tough reelection campaigns and union opposition. See, e.g.,
Patrice M. Mareschal, Innovation and Adaptation: Contrasting Efforts to Organize Home Care Workers
125
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Public and private sector union members also differed in the Due
Process Clause rights and applicable civil service laws they had in the
workplace without collective bargaining. Whereas private sector employees
could be terminated “at will” without an appeal and were presumed to have
no rights to continued employment without a collective bargaining
agreement stating differently, due process required minimum procedural
protections from sudden terminations in the public sector. Far beyond these
minimal due process protections, state and federal civil services laws also
protected public sector employees from both arbitrary and partisan
terminations.
B. The Internal Evolution: Public Sector Unions and
“Professional Unionism”
The number of government employees exploded during the decades
that followed the first public sector labor laws.130 With this unprecedented
growth, public sector unions and collective bargaining also grew in size
and acceptance, with a majority of states adopting collective bargaining
laws by the end of the 1970s and public sector union density peaking at just
over 38%.131 The workable alternatives to strikes at impasse—mainly
mediation and fact-finding—had cultivated a stabilizing image of public
sector bargaining and for the most part proven its opponents wrong.132
However, as the public employment sector grew, differences between these
new public sector union members, the union members of old, and the
representative models able to effectively aid the two became more
apparent.133
The influx of public sector employees caused a dramatic change in
union membership demographics. Unlike the prototypical private union
members from the 1950s who were “blue-collar” industrial working white
in Four States, 31 LAB. STUD. 25, 32–33 (2006) (noting that in 2000, SEIU Local 503 was instrumental
in getting Oregon to pass legislation that created a home-care commission to set the standards for inhome caregivers and serve as their employer of record). Unions have also lobbied governors to gain
rights that were not gained at the bargaining table. The efficiency of this design is that it is cheaper and
easier to convince one person to pass an executive order than persuade the majorities in both houses of
the legislature to pass similar legislation. See, e.g., 14 Ariz. Admin. Reg. 4945, 4947–49 (Dec. 26,
2008) (Governor Janet Napolitano awarding public state employees “meet and confer” rights).
130
See Tom Juravich & Kate Bronfenbrenner, Preparing for the Worst: Organizing and Staying
Organized in the Public Sector, in ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 262
(Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998) (noting that the number of government employees went from
7.8 million in 1958 to more than 15.7 million in 1978).
131
See id. (public sector union density jumping from 10.6% in 1958, to 38.2%in 1977); see also
Slater, supra note 58, at 518–19.
132
See Slater, supra note 58, at 517–18.
133
See HABER, supra note 118, at 9.
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males clad in “hard hats” and “steel-toed boots,” a substantial number of
public sector union members were “professional” or “white collar”
employees.134 On average, these public sector professional employees had
more years of education, were more likely to be female, and reported a
stronger personal attachment to their jobs and occupational identity than
conventional private sector union members.135 Moreover, the employment
values of these professional employees varied significantly from just the
traditional “bread and butter” terms and conditions of employment that
dominated private sector collectively-bargained-for contracts.136 Many of
these professional employees—by virtue of their expertise and intellectual
training—desired participation in organizational policy and a voice in
setting professional standards even more than a say in the traditional terms
and conditions of employment.137 Thus, after obtaining organizing rights,
they soon rejected the early public sector unions patterned after the private
sector model, which viewed labor and management interests as conflicting
134

See HERBERT B. ASHER ET AL., AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS IN THE ELECTORAL ARENA 28, 35
(2001). Although more than 81% of union members were blue collar in 1952, white collar professional
workers gained majority status among union members in 1996. By 2015, women made up 46% of union
membership, despite members being overwhelmingly male in 1952 (85% male), and African
Americans and Hispanics now make up a noticeable portion of the union population that was once
predominately white. Table 1: Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Selected
Characteristics,
U.S.
BUREAU
OF
LAB.
STAT.
(Jan.
26,
2017),
https://bls.gov/news.release/union2.t01.htm [https://perma.cc/B5UD-7FKQ]. See also 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(11)–(12) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). Because many professional employees are also
supervisors, the exclusion of professionals from private union membership stems in large part from the
Taft-Hartley amendment excluding “supervisors” from coverage under the NLRA. The Taft-Hartley
amendment, however, does allow nonsupervisor “professional employee[s]” to self-organize and
bargain collectively through representatives, and although still low, the rate of unionized professional
employees in the private sector is slowly increasing. See GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (2004), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/
key_workplace/174 [https://perma.cc/954X-JH3D].
135
See MAYER, supra note 134; see also GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SELECTED
CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS (2011), http://govexec.com/pdfs/
071911kl1.pdf [https://perma.cc/89DJ-ULSJ]. The trend of public employees who are union members
being generally more educated than their private sector union membership continues. In 2003, almost
three-fourths (73.6%) of union members with a bachelor’s or advanced degree were employed in the
public sector. See Richard W. Hurd & John Bunge, Unionization of Professional and Technical
Workers: The Labor Market and Institutional Transformation, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 178, 186 (Richard Freeman et al. eds., 2005).
136
David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining By
Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689, 691 (1990). Collective bargaining agreements are legally
enforceable contracts that span the course of several years and form the bedrock of the continuing
employment relationship between labor and management.
137
See id.; see also Hurd & Bunge, supra note 135, at 186 (empirical findings show that those
professionals who choose to engage in “group activity” are most interested in representational
preferences for professionals, showing that more than wages and benefits, professional employees are
concerned with having a voice in organizational policies and preserving freedom to exercise
professional judgment).
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and the bargaining scope of contractual agreements as restrictive.138 Instead,
they pushed for representatives who would negotiate collaborative roles in
professional management and policymaking,139 following a “professional
unionism” representative model.140
Even for unions open to this new professional unionism representative
model, the applicable public sector statutes presented a challenge because
they had been fashioned after federal labor law in the private sector, which
was not particularly amenable to employee roles in organizational policy.141
Federal labor law distinguishes between “mandatory” subjects of
bargaining (the “bread and butter” wage, hours, and conditions of
employment issues) from those subjects that are merely “permissive”
bargaining subjects (all other legal bargaining subjects, including those
related to organizational policy).142 The assumption that management and
labor representatives’ interests are inherently adversarial has, in the past,
made employers in the private sector reluctant to even discuss permissive

138
See Randall W. Eberts, Teachers Unions and Student Performance: Help or Hindrance?,
17 FUTURE CHILD. 175, 179 (2007) (explaining professional unions’ desires to move from an
adversarial model to a more collaborative collective bargaining one where professionals and
government decisionmakers share common goals and hold joint responsibility); see also Charles Taylor
Kerchner & Julia E. Koppich, Negotiating What Matters Most: Collective Bargaining and Student
Achievement, 113 AM. J. ED. 349, 351–52 (2007) (describing how teachers unions worked their way out
of narrowly constructed bargaining structures to include topics such as professional development and
educational standards in collective bargaining).
139
Some representatives needed less pushing to seek this kind of influence, having their roots as
professional associations prior to the public sector labor movement anyway. See Sar A. Levitan &
Frank Gallo, Can Employee Associations Negotiate New Growth?, 112 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 5, 5
(1989). Note, however, that many professional employees rejected the idea of unionization, believing
that the principles of collective bargaining were not compatible to the professional values of
collegiality, autonomy, and individual responsibility. See Henry Mintzberg, A Note on the Unionization
of Professionals from the Perspective of Organization Theory, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 623, 630–34 (1983);
see also Sanford H. Kadish et al., The Manifest Unwisdom of the AAUP as a Collective Bargaining
Agency: A Dissenting View, 58 AAUP BULL. 46, 57–61 (1972) (three dissenting members of the
governing Council of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) authoring a statement
staunchly opposed to the AAUP’s recent vote to “pursue collective bargaining as a major additional
way of realizing the Association’s goals in higher education”).
140
See Kerchner & Koppich, supra note 138, at 351–52 (describing Albert Shanker’s use of the
term “professional unionism” in the mid-1980s during a speech to AFT leaders as the turning point in
public sector union initiatives).
141
See Rabban, supra note 135, at 692–93.
142
Id. at 702–04; see also NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349–50
(1958) (bargaining proposal which “settles no term or condition of employment” does not concern a
mandatory subject of bargaining); Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Rel. Comm., Inc., 880 F.
Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995) (mandatory subjects of bargaining
encompass wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment; permissive subjects of
bargaining are all other matters).
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bargaining subjects in the interests of preserving management discretion to
the utmost extent.143
Public sector unions, however, have proved immensely successful in
bargaining over these permissive subjects, particularly as they relate to
collaborative policy roles for their professional employees.144 Teachers
unions have been at the forefront of this, negotiating provisions in
collective bargaining agreements related to the length of school days,
student–teacher ratios, instructional and preparation time, the use of
performance indicators, school safety provisions, and professional
qualifications for hire.145 But teachers are not the only professionals to
negotiate organizational decisionmaking roles in the public sector. Public
defenders and legal aid attorneys have also negotiated reduced caseloads
and adequate space to counsel their clients in privacy.146 Nurses in public
health institutions have used collective bargaining to maintain adequate
nurse–patient ratios and staffing provisions.147 And police unions have

143
See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A Call for
Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 769–71 (2011). For judicial discussions of well-drafted
“management rights” clauses in collectively bargained for contracts, wherein a union and employer
unmistakably acknowledge a certain issue as a permissive subject of bargaining and waive their right to
bargaining over a particular issue, see Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, LLC and United Food
and Commercial Workers Union, Local 1996, 352 N.L.R.B. 179 (2008), review granted, decision
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d
469 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
144
See Paul T. Hill, The Costs of Collective Bargaining Agreements and Related District Policies,
in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION 89, 91–92 (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds.,
2006) (describing the success teachers’ unions had in shaping school policy through the collective
bargaining process and permissive bargaining topics).
145
See SAUL A. RUBINSTEIN & JOHN E. MCCARTHY, COLLABORATING ON SCHOOL REFORM:
CREATING UNION-MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIPS TO IMPROVE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMS 3–5 (2010);
JONATHAN ECKERT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., LOCAL LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIPS AS A
VEHICLE TO ADVANCE REFORM 4 (2011) (describing case studies in which labor–management
partnerships have contributed to improved student outcomes in a range of areas by facilitating “teacher
leadership,” which is “essential to dynamic decision-making”).
146
See Laura Midwood & Amy Vitacco, Note, The Right of Attorneys to Unionize, Collectively
Bargain, and Strike: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 299, 308–11
(2000); see also Lesley Oelsner, 400 Legal Aid Lawyers Go on Strike for Better Pact, N.Y. TIMES, July
3, 1973, at 1; Tim Leininger, State Public Defenders, Supervisors, Vote to Unionize, J. INQUIRER (Nov.
16, 2016, 11:15 AM), http://www.journalinquirer.com/connecticut_and_region/state-public-defenderssupervisors-vote-to-unionize/article_94b20c44-ac01-11e6-a439-6f489d79609a.html
[https://perma.cc/ZZ38-DS36].
147
See, e.g., Mark Gruenberg, Nurses’ Union Ratifies Contract with Veterans Administration,
PEOPLE’S WORLD (Oct. 15, 2012, 11:58 AM) http://www.peoplesworld.org/article/nurses-unionratifies-contract-with-veterans-administration/ [https://perma.cc/FQE6-5XR4]; Jo Kroeker, Flint Nurse
Union to Take Hospital to Court, DETROIT NEWS (June 20, 2017, 7:25 PM)
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/06/20/flint-nurse-pharmacist-unionhospital-court/103054530/ [https://perma.cc/K5LG-TBJY].
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bargained for additional allotted training hours in firearm proficiency and
medical emergency care. 148
C. The Impact of Widening the Bargaining Scope in the Public Sector
Widening the typical scope of bargaining topics to influence
organizational policy was a fundamental early victory for public sector
unions. That collectively-bargained-for agreements in the public sector still
generally encompass a broader scope of activities remains a modern
distinction between public and private sector collective bargaining
mechanics. Although most state statutes regulating public sector collective
bargaining also distinguish between permissive and mandatory subjects,
government officials who bargain on the other side of the table with public
sector unions have (up until very recently) been more willing to discuss
permissive topics than private sector employers.149 Unlike in private sector
bargaining, a combination of social and political pressures made avoidance
of permissive topics in the public sector unpopular.150 For example, local
school boards were persuaded to give teachers unions a say in school
policies or curricula because teachers were the ones actually involved in the
day-to-day educational process and teachers were, more often than not, also
their constituents.151 Moreover, to the extent that teachers’ union desires to
influence permissive bargaining subjects led to an improved education
system, a school board that refused to bargain appeared to take the

148
See, e.g., Boston, Patrolmen’s Union Agree to 4-Year, $68 Million Deal, NEWSOK (Feb. 20,
2017,
5:20
AM),
http://newsok.com/boston-patrolmens-union-agree-to-4-year-68-milliondeal/article/feed/1170965 [https://perma.cc/F9NS-6W8K]; Kevin Davis, Police Unions & Officer
Survival, OFFICER.COM (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.officer.com/article/10635548/police-unions-officersurvival [https://perma.cc/E6EF-45WU].
149
See, e.g., Arthur S. Leonard, Collective Bargaining on Issues of Health and Safety in the Public
Sector: The Experience Under New York’s Taylor Law, 31 BUFF. L REV. 165, 166–68 (1982) (noting
some of the ways the New York collective bargaining statute urges public employees to bargain over
permissive subjects without making them mandatory by law). See generally Juravich &
Bronfenbrenner, supra note 129, at 264–67 (empirical findings suggesting union and collective
bargaining employer opposition in general is much lower in the public sector).
150
See Juravich & Bronfenbrenner, supra note 130, at 269–72.
151
See, e.g., Rebecca Klein, New York Teachers Union Says ‘No’ To New Education Standards,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 27, 2017, 7:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/27/ny-teachersunion-common-core_n_4676465.html [https://perma.cc/34LG-Y5GV]. Teacher union political
influence is not just amplified by the status of their membership making up part of the electorate who
elects government officials (many school districts require public school teachers to live in the district
where they teach). Empirical evidence also suggests that union members are more likely to vote in
general and primary elections and participate in other political and civil activities. See Jasmine
Kerrissey & Evan Schofer, Union Membership and Political Participation in the United States, 91 SOC.
FORCES 895, 905–07 (2013); Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Unions, Voter Turnout, and Class
Bias in the U.S. Electorate, 1964–2004, 69 J. POL. 430, 441 (2007).

629

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

universally unpopular political stance of being unwilling to improve
education.
Recently, at the urging of labor scholars—who argue that it is both
good business sense and good social policy—more private sector
employers have been open to unions facilitating additional employee voice
into the workplace.152 However, even if the scope of bargaining were to
widen in the private sector to allow professional employees a voice in
organizational policy, the impact of the wider bargaining scope would still
affect the public sector differently.153 That difference lies in the legitimate
third-party interests in public sector bargaining—the interests of citizens—
in determining public policy.154
Arguably, a citizen interest exists in even the “bread and butter”
subjects of collective bargaining in the public sector, to the extent that they
allocate public resources to one public service over another.155 However, a
more convincing concern arises when public unions negotiate bargaining
subjects that affect public policy, circumventing the ordinary legislative
and administrative processes for determining such issues.156 Again, the
public education sphere is littered with examples of this, where subjects
like curricula and class size were decided by teachers unions and school
boards at the bargaining table, denying parents and community members a
voice in determining their outcome.157 But teachers unions are not alone in
bargaining over subjects with major policy implications.
152
See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 143, at 804–09 (suggesting that worker voice in the private sector
can enhance productivity as on-the-ground employees often have useful insight concerning methods of
production and that employee voice reduces turnover costs; moreover, promoting employee voice
promotes social workplace norms, solves the problem of negotiating public goods in the workplace, and
views workers more as humans than commodities); see, e.g., CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW
UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHANGING CORPORATION 8–9, 77–81, 224 (1988)
(arguing that the current legal framework—including exclusive representation, a clear line between
exempt managers and nonexempt workers, and arbitrary lines between working conditions and
managerial domain—freezes industrial relations and inhibits needed changes); THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET
AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 234–36 (1986) (noting that
innovations in industrial relations “challenge” doctrines of employer domination, exclusive
representation, distinctions between workers and supervisors, and distinctions among bargaining
subjects).
153
See WELLINGTON & WINTER, JR., supra note 82, at 22 (1971) (arguing that the impact of
expanding the scope is not only different but also “much more troublesome” in the public sector).
154
Id. at 29, 137–42.
155
Id. at 17–18.
156
Id. at 141–42.
157
See id. at 137–38 (observing early collective agreements in New York City and New Haven
addressing class size in 1963 and 1969); see also Frederick M. Hess & Andrew P. Kelly, Scapegoat,
Albatross, or What?: The Status Quo in Teacher Collective Bargaining, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
EDUCATION: NEGOTIATING CHANGE IN TODAY’S SCHOOLS 53, 82 (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J.
Rotherham eds., 2006); Charles T. Kerchner, Union-Made Teaching: The Effects of Labor Relations on
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Indeed, police unions also have been besieged by social activist
groups claiming that bargained-for contract provisions—such as those
addressing investigations into the use of force or police misconduct—
shield officers from accountability at the community’s expense.158 Recently
the City of Chicago illustrated one of the most striking examples of this.
After a police officer shot seventeen-year-old Laquan McDonald sixteen
times in the back, the grievance procedure contained in the collectively
bargained-for police agreement allowed him to remain on the city’s payroll
for over a year following the incident.159 Other provisions within the
collective bargaining agreement protected the officer’s identity from the
public, barred investigators from reviewing his past record of civilian
complaints, and prevented the city from charging him or any other officers
involved for the false statements made during the investigation, even
though a dashboard camera video later proved those statements
unequivocally false.160 The entire incident prompted Chicago Mayor Rahm
Emanuel to remark that such collective bargaining agreements have
“essentially turned the [police] code of silence into official policy.”161
Renowned legal scholars Harry Wellington and Ralph Winter warned
of public sector unions’ potential to disproportionately impact the political
process in the early 1970s, and Justice Powell’s Abood concurrence showed
remarkable foresight in this area. But the true scope of public sector
Teaching Work, 13 REV. RES. EDUC. 317, 327 (1986). Other states have removed the issue of class size
from bargaining by addressing it in separate statutory provisions. Florida voters ratified a constitutional
amendment in 2002 to reduce class sizes to 18 for prekindergarten through Grade 3, 22 for Grades 4
through 8, and 25 for Grades 9 through 12. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (2002); see also S.J. Res. 2, 112th
Leg. (Fla. 2010) (joint resolution proposing to amend Article IX, Section 1, of the Florida Constitution
relating to class sizes, revising language so that maximum and minimum class size requirements apply
to each school’s class grade average and not every class individually).
158
See Conor Friedersdorf, Black Lives Matter Takes Aim at Police-Union Contracts, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 7, 2015) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/black-lives-matter-takes-aim-atpolice-union-contracts/418530/ [https://perma.cc/N99G-MQH7] (noting that several cities have
collective bargaining agreements with police unions that require delays before an officer investigated
for use of force can be interviewed, mandatory paid leave when an officer discharges a weapon, and the
protection of their identity from the public).
159
See Editorial Board, When Police Unions Impede Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2016, at SR8;
Adeshina Emmanuel, Chicago Police Contract Scrutinized in the Aftermath of Laquan Mcdonald’s
Death, CHI. REP. (Dec. 10, 2015), http://chicagoreporter.com/chicago-police-contract-scrutinized-inthe-aftermath-of-laquan-mcdonalds-death/ [https://perma.cc/3LBF-JXZQ]; Nausheen Husain, Laquan
McDonald Timeline: The Shooting, the Video, and the Fallout, CHI. TRIB. (June 27, 2017, 6:13 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquanmcdonald/ct-graphics-laquan-mcdonald-officers-firedtimeline-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/H8C7-6TR4]; Agreement Between Fraternal Order of the
Police Chicago Lodge No. 7 and the City of Chicago (July 1, 2012), https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/5516f090e4b01b711314608f/t/55d0b066e4b0c6285c50236b/1439740006221/Chicago-FOPContract.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q376-ZRMT].
160
Emmanuel, supra note 159.
161
Editorial Board, supra note 159.
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collective bargaining, and the extent of its impact, could not have been
known.162 In fact, even now in contemporary public workplaces, we only
know for sure that to the extent union activities influence public policy,
“[n]othing endures but change.”163 Public sector union activity and
influence is always shifting, context specific, politically dependent, and
responsive to technological initiatives. Fortunately, state and local
lawmakers have proven proficient and flexible cartographers when it comes
to mapping out the boundaries of collective bargaining to fit the needs of
their jurisdiction.
D. The External Evolution: Legislation
Abood addressed a Michigan public sector collective bargaining
statute in its earliest form, when it was most similar to the private sector
federal model.164 Unlike their predecessors, public sector labor laws have
proven much more tolerant of innovation, existing in a wide variety of
models today throughout state and local jurisdictions.165 In a genuine
illustration of states working as laboratories of democracy,166 state
lawmakers have modified their public sector collective bargaining
legislation to experiment with and evaluate solutions addressing a variety
of issues.167 Solutions to issues directly relating to the political nature of

162

See supra notes 144–48; see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 223 (1977).
THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 356 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006) (thought to be attributable to
the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus).
164
See Abood, 431 U.S. at 212–14, 222. Like most states, Michigan’s first collective bargaining
statute was modeled after federal law with many provisions nearly identical to the NLRA and RLA. Id.;
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 423.201–217 (1979).
165
Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector Labor
Law Spectrum, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 735, 735 (2009); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, The
Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1531–32 (2002) (describing the
institutional barriers that have left private sector labor law virtually untouched since the LandrumGriffin Act of 1959, much to the frustration of reform advocates).
166
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Justice
Louis Brandeis popularizing the concept of state and local governments as laboratories to enact and test
new social and economic policies).
167
Id.; see also Hodges, supra note 165, at 737–48. For additional experimental efforts in state
labor legislation, see Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 3500–3511 (West 2001.), as explained in Joseph R. Grodin,
Public Employee Bargaining in California: The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts, 23 HASTINGS
L.J. 719, 720–21, 737 (1972) (California experimenting with a proportional, as opposed to an exclusive
representation labor statute for public employees from 1961 to 1976), and see also WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.70(1)(nc) (1993), repealed by A.B. 75, § 2224, 99th Leg. (Wis. 2009), as explained in Martin
Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in the Public Sector: A Search for Common Elements, 27 ABA J. LAB.
& EMP. LAW 149, 151 & n.16 (2012) (discussing Wisconsin’s 1993–2009 experimentation with a
qualified economic offer (QEO) bargaining prohibition, which preempted bargaining over school
employee wages if a school district’s wage offer met a prescribed formula). In 2009, Wisconsin
repealed the QEO. Id.
163
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public sector collective bargaining have already been worked into many
state and local legal frameworks. These issues include the permission and
collection methods of agency fees and the scope of bargaining subjects, and
their resolution is part of an ongoing effort by states to build the most
responsive model for their jurisdictions. States’ significantly different and
often-modified public sector collective bargaining statutes now merit
additional consideration and weight in future litigation. Put another way,
thanks to states’ flexibility in amending, eliminating, and narrowing their
public sector collective bargaining regimes over the last few decades, all
agency fees, their permitting statutory provisions, and the stated
justifications behind them are not created equal.
1. Legislative Limits to Collective Bargaining
To restrict the impact public sector unions had on public policy, states
began narrowing the scope of public sector collective bargaining subjects
by statute and judicial interpretation as early as the 1980s.168 Not
surprisingly, these early exclusions concerned teachers unions and the
somewhat controversial bargaining topics that related to educational
initiatives. In 1982, New Jersey made school curriculum, class size, and the
length of the school day illegal bargaining topics because they were to be
decided “not by negotiation . . . but by the political process.”169 Kansas,170
Delaware,171 Maine,172 and Nevada173 soon followed with their own
excluded bargaining topics for teachers unions. Michigan would amend its
collective bargaining laws in the 1990s to prohibit teachers unions from
bargaining over an enumerated list of topics, such as the privatization of
non-instructional educational services, charter school approval, and the
starting day of the school term.174 In 2011, Michigan amended its statute
168

See supra notes 155–62.
In re Local 195 v. State, 443 A.2d 187, 191 (N.J. 1982).
170
S.B. 551, Ch. 167 (Kan. 2002) (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5413(l)(3) (2015)) (making
school term and school hours not subject to bargaining).
171
Colonial Sch. Bd. v. Colonial Affiliate, 449 A.2d 243, 247 (Del. 1982) (topics other than
“salaries, employee benefits, and working conditions” are prohibited from bargaining).
172
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965(1)(c) (2014) (excluding “educational policies” from scope
of bargaining).
173
NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.150 (1975) (removing “[a]ppropriate staffing levels and work
performance standards,” the “quality and quantity” of public services, and “[t]he means and methods of
offering these services” from the scope of bargaining).
174
1994 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 112 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.215 (West 2014));
see also Malin, supra note 167, at 151, 159 (noting that twice-elected Michigan governor John Engler
campaigned forcefully on educational reform initiatives); Benjamin M. Superfine & Jessica J. Gottlieb,
Teacher Evaluation and Collective Bargaining: The New Frontier of Civil Rights, 2014 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 737, 746–49 (describing how the large-scale education policy reform of the late 1980s and early
1990s bred a climate that elected John Engler and embraced collective bargaining restraints on teacher
169
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again to prohibit teacher union bargaining over, inter alia, teacher
placements, performance evaluations, and education standards.175
Instead of listing the excluded bargaining subjects, Idaho and Indiana
have preferred to limit the scope of teacher union bargaining by listing the
allowable bargaining subjects within their statutes and expressly
prohibiting everything else.176 Wisconsin’s collective bargaining statute
explicitly limits the scope of bargaining for all public sector employees
(except for police, firefighters, and municipal transit employees) to the
single issue of “base wages.”177 Other bargaining topics are prohibited.178
Some states have, for policy reasons, taken away all bargaining rights for
specific types of public employees, while others have prohibited particular
bargaining subjects like healthcare across the board.179
While the state initiatives above exemplify attempts to limit the scope
of bargaining on policy issues, other states have preserved bargaining rights
over these same matters by statute or case law, even making some not just
permissive but mandatory bargaining subjects. Illinois and California, for
example, have both experimented with “class size” as a mandatory
bargaining subject for teachers unions and their employers.180 Despite the
state having a broad scope of bargaining subjects for its public employees,
California has crafted other alternatives for the public to be heard on
bargaining matters related to policy. For instance, for some classes of
unions). The igniting spark to such reform was the 1983 report A Nation at Risk. Drafted by the
National Committee on Educational Excellence, the report viewed America’s educational system as a
national crisis, noting that: “[T]he educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by
a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people.” DAVID P. GARDNER
ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR
EDUCATIONAL
REFORM
13
(1983),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED226006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JU7M-QNB4].
175
2011 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 103.
176
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33.1272 (West 2017); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-29-6-4 to -4.5 (West 2017).
177
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.91(3) (West 2017).
178
Id. For another interesting state model on regulating the bargaining scope, but still preserving a
professional element of choice, see the current Kansas statute regarding teacher contract bargaining,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5423(b)(1) (2015). This statute requires that, along with compensation and the
required amount of hours, each party may select no more than three additional “terms and conditions of
professional service” from an enumerated list as mandatory bargaining topics. Id. All other terms and
conditions not selected are then deemed permissive bargaining topics, only subject to negotiation if the
parties mutually agree. Id.
179
See S.B. 98, § 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6 (Nev. 2011) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.140
(2011)) (removing bargaining rights from physicians, lawyers, and supervisors); see also MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 32B, § 23(a) (West 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:16-17.1.a. (West 2017)
180
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3543.2 (West 2015); 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10 (1984); see also Decatur
Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 536 N.E.2d 743, 744 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (interpreting
class size as a mandatory bargaining subject under 115 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10 because class size “directly
affected terms and conditions of employment”).
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public employees, their legislative scheme requires that all initial
bargaining proposals be presented at a public meeting so citizens may
express their views.181
2.

Legislative Limits to Agency Fees
Aside from “right to work” states, which prohibit all agency fee
agreements in both the private and public sectors, states have limited
agency fee rights and their influence on political activity through a variety
of other statutory forms.182 For example, several states have proposed
“paycheck protection” laws that prohibit the deduction of union dues or
agency fees from public employee paychecks.183 Alabama, for example,
tested a statutory prohibition on the political use of any money collected
through public employee payroll deductions, and Michigan barred the
payroll deduction of all union dues for only public school teachers.184
Others have experimented with “opt in” paycheck legislation, which would
require employees to reauthorize annually if they wish to have union
dues/agency fees deducted from their paychecks.185 Other proposals have
required unions to obtain written consent from members in order to deduct
money from their paychecks for political purposes.186

181

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3547 (West 2015).
See Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt & Winston Lin, The Great Recession, the Resulting Budget
Shortfalls, the 2010 Elections and the Attack on Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the United
States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 407, 428–31 (2012) (describing the passage of right to work
legislation from the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947 through 2012). When this Article went to print,
twenty-eight states were right to work states with Missouri being the last to enact legislation in
February 2017. Right to Work: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF.
FOUND. (2017), http://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/55DBYNZ7]. However, even right to work exists on a spectrum in the laboratory that is state labor law. For
example, Indiana, which passed right to work legislation in the 1950s and then repealed it in the 1960s,
is now right to work again as of 2012. Dau-Schmidt & Lin, supra, at 428–31. Moreover, ten states have
actually included right to work provisions in their constitutions, presumably to make them harder to
repeal. Id. at 429 n.152.
183
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-361.02). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95–98 (2017); VA.
CODE. ANN. §§ 40.1–57.2 (2017) (although North Carolina and Virginia bar public sector collective
bargaining, both states allow for the payroll deduction of union dues).
184
ALA. CODE § 17-17-5 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-361.02 (2016). The 2010 Alabama
Act amending Alabama Code § 17-17-5 with payroll deduction prohibitions was enjoined from taking
effect based on a First Amendment challenge in Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. Bentley, 788 F. Supp. 2d 1283,
1327–28 (N.D. Ala. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. State Superintendent of Educ., 746 F.3d
1135 (11th Cir. 2014). The Eleventh Circuit narrowed the injunction, however, allowing the law to take
effect so long as it applied only to dues deductions for electioneering activities. State Superintendent of
Educ., 746 F.3d at 1153.
185
See, e.g., S.B. 5000, 53rd Leg. (Wash. 1993).
186
See, e.g., H.R. 1625, § 4, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. (1996); California
Proposition 226 (June 2, 1998).
182
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At least two states, New Jersey and Minnesota, have set statutory
maximums for agency fees as they relate to the full cost of union member
dues within the same bargaining unit.187 And although California allows for
agency fee agreements within the public sector, its statute also includes
provisions allowing for the rescission of such agreements by a majority
vote of the bargaining unit employees.188
Comparing the different statutory forms and scopes of state legislative
collective bargaining and agency fee models demonstrates that states come
up with their own solutions and create their own boundaries for public
unions and their political activity. Abood’s bright line, however, displaces
their working boundaries and legislative efforts.
E. The External Evolution: Public Perception
With the early concerns about public sector collective bargaining put
to rest, public sector unions were widely accepted by the public on both
sides of the political aisle by the late 1970s. Indeed, Abood marked the
beginning of a period of unwavering public approval for public sector
unions, a remarkable feat considering the continued decline of their private
sector counterparts.189 If unions in the private sector were dominated by
competition, turbulence, and uncertainty in the 1980s, 1990s, and early
2000s, public unions by contrast were their secure and stable younger
siblings.
Success ushered in more success. With public sector workers able to
choose unions and enjoy labor relations in a climate largely free from the
threats and intimidation that were commonplace in the private sector, even
more public workers lined up for representation.190 This prevailing
enthusiasm enabled most public sector unions to win certification elections
by large margins in the ’80s and ’90s, despite running low-intensity
organizing campaigns.191 Public sector unions’ esteem meant that in
addition to employers offering little to no opposition to certification, state
and local officials negotiated favorable deals to preserve their relationships
with these popular institutions.192 These favorable deals only bolstered the
187

See MINN. STAT. § 179A.06 (3) (2012) (fair share fees are not to exceed 85% of regular
membership dues); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.5(b) (West 2002).
188
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3515.7(d) (West 2015).
189
See Robert Hebdon et al., Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Tumultuous Times, in
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER DURESS: CASE STUDIES OF MAJOR NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRIES
255, 257 (Howard R. Stranger et al. eds., 2013). Public sector union density remained extraordinarily
constant from 2001 (36.8%) to 2011 (37.0%). Id.
190
See Juravich & Bronfenbrenner, supra note 130, at 262–64, 269.
191
Id. at 264–66, 269.
192
Id. at 266–68.
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public sector unions’ claims that they provided a valuable service to their
membership that was worth the investment.193
1. The Great Recession
Public sector unions were not the only ones feeling secure by the mid2000s, as prosperity was in full swing throughout the United States.194
Fueled by historically low interest rates, low unemployment, and accessible
credit, an unprecedented number of American households became
homeowners through subprime mortgages.195 High demand caused the
median home value to skyrocket, and as home values rose, more families
spent money as if they were wealthier than their true salaries and wages
suggested.196 As large segments of the population prospered, a “trickle up”
effect occurred in the budget offices of state and local governments.197
Amidst budget surpluses fueled by sales and property tax increases, states
and local governments went on spending sprees—increasing public wages,
building infrastructure, and even authorizing resident rebates—in lieu of
saving for a rainy day.198
193

See Richard W. Hurd & Tamara L. Lee, Public Sector Unions Under Siege: Solidarity in the
Fight Back, 39 LAB. STUD. J. 9, 11–12, 19 (2014).
194
See THOM REILLY, supra note 123, at 3–4 (2012). Of course, private sector unions—which have
been in decline since the mid 1980s—were one noteworthy exception to the economic prosperity
experienced in the early 2000s. See MEGAN DUNN & JAMES WALKER, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS,
UNION
MEMBERSHIP
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
1
(2016),
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016/union-membership-in-the-united-states/pdf/union-membership-inthe-united-states.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2EQ-QS63].
195
KATALINA M. BIANCO, THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE
MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 1, 6 (2008) https://business.cch.com/images/banner/subprime.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2YRW-MJM5]. See generally NEVA GOODWIN ET AL., MACROECONOMICS IN
CONTEXT ch. 15 (2nd ed. 2017) (providing background on the “Financial Crisis and the Great
Recession”). A subprime mortgage is a type of high interest or adjustable interest mortgage issued to
borrowers with low credit ratings. They are issued to individuals who do not qualify for a conventional
mortgage because of their high risk of default. Between 1996 and 2006, the national share of subprime
mortgage to total mortgage originations increased from nine percent to twenty percent. BIANCO, supra,
at 6.
196
See Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the Resulting
Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 125–26 (2009). After the housing bubble
inflated home values, homeowners—believing that their home’s value would continue to increase as it
had every year in the past since the Great Depression—withdrew high amounts of equity out of their
newly valued home to spend. Id. at 126–27. In 1996, former Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan
famously called this phenomenon “irrational exuberance.” Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve of
the U.S., The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society, Remarks at the Annual Dinner
and Francis Boyer Lecture of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Dec. 5,
1996),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm
[https://perma.cc/643C-YEYZ].
197
See REILLY, supra note 123, at 4.
198
“States predominantly tax income and sales, while localities depend primarily on property
taxes.” Tracy Gordon, State and Local Budgets and the Great Recession, BROOKINGS (Dec. 31, 2012),
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But in 2007, the United States housing market collapsed under a slew
of high-risk subprime mortgages that went unpaid. Knee-deep in defaulting
loans, many banks and lending institutions panicked and tried to quickly
sell off bad mortgages on Wall Street as cheaply as possible.199 Moreover,
banks, now paralyzed by their toxic assets and looking to hoard cash,
stopped lending, causing a credit crisis that effectively froze the American
economy and began a countrywide recession.200 The recession lasted
officially from December 2007 through June 2009, and its impact was felt
so universally throughout the American economy that modern economists
now refer to it as just the “Great Recession.”201
2. After the Great Recession
After the Great Recession, federal and state government deficits
surged as tax revenues fell to historic lows and demands for public
programs rose.202 Although Congress initially helped offset states’ longterm
budgeting gaps with unprecedented fiscal relief in the form of the $787
billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), the
problem only intensified in fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012 as ARRA
funds dried up.203 Thus, faced with impending budgeting shortfalls, states
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/state-and-local-budgets-and-the-great-recession/
[https://perma.cc/5QGT-7K34]; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE
EXPENDITURE REPORT 61, 64 (2011); REILLY, supra note 193, at 4 (noting that Utah approved a $1
billion long-term road and highway plan during this prosperous period, while the Nevada state
legislature in 2005 actually approved a rebate to every Nevada resident who owned a vehicle, after the
state’s gas tax helped produce a $300 million state surplus).
199
See Manav Tanneeru, How a ‘Perfect Storm’ Led to the Economic Crisis, CNN (Jan. 29, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/01/29/economic.crisis.explainer/index.html
[https://perma.cc/MWC9ZHFA].
200
See Holt, supra note 196, at 125.
201
See Paul Krugman, Opinion, The Great Recession Versus the Great Depression, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 20, 2009, 4:35 PM), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/the-great-recession-versusthe-great-depression [https://perma.cc/6N3M-BC7N] (Krugman, a Nobel Prize-winning economist and
New York Times columnist, labeling the recent crisis as the “Great Recession”). For this paper, the
author refers to the period of recession following the mortgage and financial crisis as the “Great
Recession.” See REILLY, supra note 123, at 5–6. At its worst, unemployment would rise to 10.1% as
more than 14 million people found themselves out of work, and America’s household net worth would
fall from $66 trillion to $49 trillion. Moreover, more than 3.5 million homes would be returned to the
banks who financed their mortgage. Id. at 5.
202
See Gordon, supra note 198, at 4 (citing to the U.S. Census Bureau figures). State and local
revenues fell during the Great Recession after sales taxes, income taxes, and property taxes plummeted.
Id. At their lowest, in 2009 state taxes were down 17% from where they were one year before. Id.
During these revenue declines, spending pressures—specifically in the form of increased enrollments
for Medicaid, unemployment insurance, and higher education—increased. Id.
203
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1553(a)(1),
123 Stat. 115, 297 (2009); see also Edward Ashbee, The Obama Administration, the Promise of
Reform, and the Role of Business Interests, in ISSUES IN AMERICAN POLITICS POLARIZED POLITICS IN
THE AGE OF OBAMA 57, 62 (John Dumbrell ed., 2013); Gordon, supra note 198, at 7.
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cut spending on education, healthcare, and social services; raised fees
related to businesses, court access, and higher education; and negotiated
significant concessions in their employee collective bargaining
agreements.204 Other states raised taxes to balance their budgets in spite of
strong opposition from a beaten-down constituency.205
Myriad voters in economic distress were the perfect amplifiers for
conservative Republican songs of government being too large and
expensive. Thus, despite President Barack Obama’s victory in 2008, the
Great Recession and the country’s slow economic recovery brought forth a
political shift during the 2010 midterm elections.206 Many voters now
perceived state governments’ overspending as an “ideological overreach”
and, in response, delivered significant election victories to Republican
candidates—specifically Tea Party-aligned candidates—who promised
smaller government and lower taxes.207 The Democratic Party’s shellacking
in 2010 gave control of the House to Republicans, who also claimed six
new seats in the Senate.208 At the state level, the losses proved to be even
greater as Republicans took complete control of twenty states after winning
eleven new governorships and eighteen additional state legislatures.209
Republicans’ new control of both legislative and executive branches at
the state level set the stage for a startlingly coordinated national campaign

204

See REILLY, supra note 123, at 6–7.
See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Californians Back Taxes to Avoid Education Cuts, N.Y. TIMES,
(Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/in-california-voters-approve-ballotmeasure-that-raises-taxesin-california-approve-voters-ballot-measure-that-raisestaxes.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%253
[https://perma.cc/L94M-S4QN] ; THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, AN INCREASE IN PROPERTY AND
SALES TAX REVENUE HELPED NEW YORK BOUNCE BACK FROM THE GREAT RECESSION (2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2013/11/11/new_york_profile.pdf?la=it
[https://perma.cc/EU36-VBLU] (describing the property and sales tax increases in California and New
York during the Great Recession).
206
See Paul Harris & Ewen MacAskill, US Midterm Election Results Herald New Political Era as
Republicans Take House, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2010, 12:22 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2010/nov/03/us-midterm-election-results-tea-party [https://perma.cc/55WU-HSS7].
207
See Larry M. Bartels, Political Effects of the Great Recession 12 (Vanderbilt Univ. Center for
the Study of Democratic Insts., Working Paper No. 6-2013, 2013), http://www.vanderbilt.edu/
csdi/research/CSDI_WP_06-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HK4-MYYB]; see also THEDA SKOCPOL &
VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE REMAKING OF REPUBLICAN CONSERVATISM 4
(2012).
208
See Bartels, supra note 207, at 12.
209
See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2010 STATE AND LEGISLATIVE PARTISAN
COMPOSITION
(2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/LegisControl_2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AG4L-YQ7R]; cf. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2011 STATE AND
LEGISLATIVE
PARTISAN
COMPOSITION
(2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/
LegisControl_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TVB-ZX6T] (illustrating the over 700 seats lost by
Democrats in state legislatures during the 2010 midterm election).
205
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against big government, the “privileged” public worker, and the public
sector unions that sustained them.210 With help from conservative editorials
and free market special interests groups like the American Legislative
Exchange Council (ALEC) and the Mackinac Center, Republican
lawmakers made public union workers—and their salaries, benefits, and
pension costs—the scapegoats for high taxes and state budget deficits.211
These groups proved dramatically successful in changing the fifty-year-old
narrative of the humble, modest-living public servant into an “elite class”
of public pension millionaires, siphoning public resources and opposing
privatization and progressive change.212
Armed with this new narrative of the overcompensated public worker
and a library of predrafted legislation, lawmakers got to work, fervently
introducing legislation to weaken public sector collective bargaining in
2011. Over the next two years, 733 bills in 42 states relating to public
employee unions were introduced, and 21 states would pass some form of
210
See Hurd & Lee, supra note 193, at 14; see also Monica Davey, One-Party Control Opens
States to Partisan Rush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2012, at A1 (noting that state legislatures have become
more partisan on both ends of the political spectrum, enabling activists to push through their agendas).
In 2013, a single party maintained complete government control over more state governments (thirtyseven) than any other time within the last sixty years. See Davey, supra. “Complete government
control” within this context refers to one party holding the governor’s office and majorities in both
legislative chambers.
211
See JASON STEIN & PATRICK MARLEY, MORE THAN THEY BARGAINED FOR 39–41 (2013).
ALEC is a membership organization comprised of state legislators and corporations for the purpose of
drafting free market model legislation. Although it brands itself as a “nonpartisan” partnership between
officials and leaders in commerce, the “partnership”—which includes inter alia corporate members
Exxon Mobil, Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Wal-Mart, Phillip Morris, and Koch Industries—has been
criticized by some for its ties to other well-known conservative donors and think tanks like the Bradley
Foundation, the Heritage Foundation, Goldwater Institute, and the Mackinac Center for Public Policy.
Id. at 40–41. The Mackinac Center is the largest think tank devoted to state-level policies. Its
contributions to the events in Wisconsin are noteworthy in discussing the change in public perception
because they are considered the experts in constructing favorable narratives of right-wing objectives.
Mackinac Center Vice President and former research scholar Joseph P. Overton invented the concept of
the Overton Window, which describes policy positions that are acceptable to the public. “Shifting the
window” is the process of making previously unthinkable positions appear acceptable or vice versa. See
Joseph Lehman, The Overton Window: A Model of Policy Change, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y
(last visited Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow [https://perma.cc/DR7V4W9V].
212
See, e.g., Andrew Biggs & Jason Richwine, The Public Worker Gravy Train, WALL ST. J., Feb.
24, 2011, at A15; Tim Pawlenty, Government Unions vs. Taxpayers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2010, at
A19; The Government Pay Boom, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2010, at A18; Andrew G. Biggs, How to
Become a (Public Pension) Millionaire; In Five States, an Average Full-Career Retiree Receives a
Retirement Income Higher than His Final Salary, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/andrew-biggs-how-to-become-a-public-pension-millionaire-1394834779
[https://perma.cc/R7BR-4XRM]. But see Jeffrey H. Keefe, State and Local Public Employees: Are They
Overcompensated?, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 239 (2012) (data analyses indicating that the total
compensation package of state and local public employees—when controlled for factors like education
and experience—is on average 3.7% less than similar employees in the private sector).
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legislation limiting public sector collective bargaining.213 Because the
media covered many of these attempts extensively, and they have since
been the topic of admirable scholarly works, this Article relies on prior
scholarly contributions and does not review all of these attacks in detail.214
It will instead focus on two particularly poignant moments that encapsulate
the shifting public opinion of public sector collective bargaining after 2010.
3. Wisconsin and New Jersey
The first was a confrontation between New Jersey Governor Chris
Christie and an elementary school art teacher, Marie Corfield. After cutting
into state aid for education, laying off teachers, and using some disdainful
words to describe New Jersey’s public education system, the new Governor
held a town hall meeting, which Ms. Corfield attended.215 During their
interaction, which was captured on video, Ms. Corfield timidly asked the
Governor how his reforms will help the middle class when “so many
middle-class teachers are spending tons of money out of their pocket to
supplement the budgets that were cut so they can buy supplies.”216
Governor Christie’s responded dismissively to her claims that she “would
have a hard time paying her bills” after the cuts, his demeanor aggressive
as he accused Ms. Corfield of showmanship and his tone pugnaciousness
and filled with contempt as he defended his “lambasting” of New Jersey’s
teachers union.217 However, if one were to guess which person received a
stream of abusive emails and Facebook postings in response to the video,

213
See Dau-Schmidt & Lin, supra note 182, at 413 (observing that of these twenty-one states,
twelve of them—Wisconsin, Ohio, Indiana, Arizona, Idaho, Michigan, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming—passed “significant restrictions on public sector
collective bargaining”). ALEC highlighted several model bills designed to limit public sector collective
bargaining at its biannual Task Force Summit in December 2010. These model bills were introduced in
several state legislatures, nearly unaltered, over the next two years. STEIN & MARLEY, supra note 211,
at 39.
214
See generally Dau-Schmidt & Lin, supra note 182; Martin H. Malin, Life After Act 10?: Is
There a Future for Collective Representation of Wisconsin Public Employees?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 623
(2012); Martin H. Malin, Sifting Through the Wreckage of the Tsunami that Hit Public Sector
Collective Bargaining, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 533 (2012); Malin, supra note 167; Slater, supra
note 58; Bryan J. Soukup, From Coolidge to Christie: Historical Antecedents of Current Government
Officials Dealing with Public Sector Labor Unions, 64 LAB. L.J. 177 (2013).
215
See, e.g., Amanda Carey, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie Blasts Teachers’ Unions (Again)
in Washington, D.C. Speech, DAILY CALLER (Jan. 1, 2010, 1:24 AM), http://dailycaller.com/
2010/12/01/new-jersey-governor-chris-christie-blasts-teachers-unions-again-in-washington-d-c-speech/
[https://perma.cc/P6YY-8Z34].
216
See GovChristie, Governor Christie Responds to Teacher During Town Hall, YOUTUBE (Sept.
8, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkuTm-ON904 [https://perma.cc/R9TT-SW3B]. This
video went viral after Governor Christie’s staff shared it on his website. To date, it has been viewed
almost 1.5 million times. Id.
217
Id.
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and which one was celebrated as a YouTube sensation, one would probably
be wrong. Conservatives praised the New Jersey governor and school
choice advocate for taking on his state’s obstinate public sector unions.218
The elementary school art teacher got hate mail.219
The second example of the public shift was Wisconsin’s enactment of
Act 10. While adequate prior coverage does not require this Article to
recall the collective bargaining restrictions in Act 10, the protestors
sleeping on the capitol floors, and the subsequent recall, what should be
reiterated is that all of this happened in Wisconsin. Once the model
progressive state for workers’ rights and employee relations, Wisconsin
was the first state to pass workers compensation legislation; the first to
enact unemployment insurance laws; the birthplace of the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME); and
one of the first three states to bar employment discrimination based on race,
creed, and national origin.220 Of course, all of these accomplishments paled
in comparison to being the first state to enact comprehensive collective
bargaining legislation for the public sector.221 Wisconsin led the nation in
progressive working trends in the early twentieth century, and the Badger
State’s models tended to end up all over the country.222 Thus, if Act 10
could desecrate collective bargaining rights in Wisconsin, many believed
that collective bargaining rights were vulnerable everywhere. Even
collective bargaining’s staunchest supporters were left wondering: if
Wisconsin was again acting as a harbinger for the nation, was the American
labor movement fated to collapse?
Few issues are more partisan now than public sector collective
bargaining rights. So much so that some public sector unions have been
forced to become more political just to shield themselves from right-wing
conservative attacks. While public unions are certainly hard to paint as true
“victims” in the American labor scheme, it is important to note that much

218
See, e.g., April Girouard, Christie Embraces YouTube Stardom, FOX NEWS (Nov. 29, 2010),
ttp://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/11/29/christie-embraces-youtube-stardom.html
[https://perma.cc/AL4F-GQWX]; Richard Pérez-Peña, Talking Tough and Drawing Viewers, New
Jersey’s Governor Is a YouTube Star, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at A26.
219
David A. Fahrenthold, Getting Chris Christie’s Goat: Activists Try to Rile Up Governor, Pile
Up Some YouTube Hits, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/getting-chris-christies-goat-activists-try-to-rile-up-governor-pile-up-some-youtube-hits/2014/
12/20/c1f4c29e-865d-11e4-9534-f79a23c40e6c_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q75L-KYX3].
220
See STEIN & MARLEY, supra note 211, at 64–66.
221
Id.
222
Id.

642

112:597 (2018)

Reconciling Agency Fee Doctrine

of their modern political activity may be reactionary.223 As such, agency fee
opponents who criticize public sector unions in the courts for their
reactionary political activities may be unjustly blaming the victim.
Moreover, public unions find themselves in a unique “catch-22” if they are
under fervent partisan attack and any response dooms their primary source
of support in a legal challenge because their responsive activities are too
political. For this reason, a modern and fair balancing of public union
interests and activities in any First Amendment analysis is paramount to
their future survival.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S EVOLUTION AFTER ABOOD
Abood also marked the beginning of a transformative period for the
Supreme Court in First Amendment jurisprudence. Before the late 1970s,
financial contributions were not “speech,” associations had no expressive
rights, campaign finance law as we now know it did not exist, and First
Amendment principles in all forms were understood to be context specific
and conditional. But beginning with Buckley and picking up speed in the
2000s, the Court has substantially modified First Amendment doctrine,
protecting expression in more depth and expounding upon its interrelated
association and expression principles.224 Some of these changes have
aligned with the reasoning in Abood and other agency fee cases more than
others, justifiably producing scholarly criticisms of modern First
Amendment jurisprudence as “remarkably erratic and fragmented.”225

223
See, e.g., Matea Gold & Melanie Mason, Labor Unions Rethinking Their Role in Politics, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/10/nation/la-na-labor-endorse-20120311
[https://perma.cc/85NK-8H6G].
224
See generally Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom—The Roberts Court, the First
Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409 (2013) (noting a post-Chaplinsky
resurgence by the Roberts Court recognizing categorical First Amendment exceptions and protections,
which the author terms “new absolutism,” wherein certain types of speech are absolutely protected
while other categories are per se unprotected speech); G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the
Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 391 (1992)
(tracing the evolution of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s First Amendment interpretations, from his
early common law influences and “clear and present danger” formula, to his later role as the “founder of
modern First Amendment jurisprudence” with his speech-protective positions recognizing free speech
as a central constitutional right).
225
Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a
Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 251 (2004).
Although McDonald’s quote relates to newsgathering cases, his criticism is common regarding other
types of First Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan & Robert C. Post, Colloquy,
It’s What’s for Lunch: Nectarines, Mushrooms, and Beef—The First Amendment and Compelled
Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 359, 365–67 (2007) (describing “doctrinal instability and
incoherence” in compelled-subsidy doctrine).
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As discussed in Part I and explained further below, agency fee
doctrine touches on First Amendment principles relating to one’s right to
associate (or not to associate) with members of an organization for
expressive purposes. But the extent to which this expressive association is
protected—and how courts reconcile this relationship with the new
expressive rights of the association itself—is still unclear. Agency fee
doctrine may also relate to not having to speak, or sponsor another’s
speech, against one’s will. But surely not all forced payments can be
compelled speech, or else one may have a First Amendment right not to
pay taxes or at least be entitled to a pro rata refund for taxes that support
government initiatives with which one disagrees.
This Section examines First Amendment cases since Buckley and
Abood in an attempt to flesh out how the concerns they raised work in other
contexts and to identify doctrinal commonalities.
A. Compelled Contributions as Compelled Speech in Campaign Finance
As mentioned above in Part I, following Buckley, the Supreme Court
in Abood extended First Amendment coverage to agency fees paid to a
union for collective bargaining and contract-related expenses.226 Since then,
the Court’s entire agency fee jurisprudence up through and including
Harris and Knox has insisted that the payment of all agency fees is
expressive, despite scholarly arguments and a slew of other compelled
contribution cases to the contrary.227
1.

Buckley Revisited with an Emphasis on Contributions’ Expressive
Purpose and Abood
The Court’s bedrock decision in Buckley v. Valeo was that financial
contributions, made for the purpose of spreading a political message, are
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.228 Buckley’s impact
on political campaigns over time cannot be overstated.229 However, when
Abood was decided just a year later, Buckley’s doctrinal significance was
unknown and its reasoning untested. At times, the Abood Court’s

226

See supra Section I.B.1.
See generally Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional
Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 3, 14–15 (1983) (describing the Court’s
inappropriate acceptance of the extension of the First Amendment doctrine to forced monetary
contributions).
228
424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (per curiam).
229
See TOOBIN, supra note 74, at 150 (observing that the decision in Buckley was so significant
that it practically “created an entirely new area of law,” as campaign finance regulation was born out of
the federal government’s and states’ frantic reconstruction of spending and contribution limits in
response to its elusive guidance).
227
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inexperience with Buckley’s newly crafted doctrine is apparent. For
instance, the Court in Abood correctly relied on Buckley for the principle
that contributions in support of a cause may be expressive and that
restricting these contributions may infringe on a contributor’s First
Amendment rights.230 But it lost sight of Buckley’s primary reasoning when
it concluded that compelled contributions are the corollary expressive
infringement to restrictions on contributions.231 The key inference in
Buckley was that voluntary political contributions were expressive because
the contributor intended the contribution as “support of an ideological
cause.”232 As such, compelled payments of any kind lose their expressive
aspect because they are mandatory, irrespective of a person’s intent or
endorsement.233 Although the Court misinterpreted the expressive notion of
forced agency fees in Abood, it has insisted on interpreting them as
expressive ever since.
Despite the Abood Court’s dubious reliance on Buckley for its holding
that compelled political contributions are expressive, Buckley and its
campaign finance descendants are still important features to any future
agency fee analysis because of the distinctions they draw between “pure
political speech” and expressive contributions.234 Unlike political
expenditures—which Buckley viewed as essentially speech itself, invoking
strict or exacting scrutiny analysis—Buckley distinguished expressive
contributions as something less:235 an expressive or “symbolic act” that
triggered a lesser level of scrutiny.236

230

See 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977).
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2.

Modern Campaign Finance Decisions Expand on the Lesser Level
of Scrutiny—“Closely Drawn Scrutiny”
In more recent campaign finance decisions, the Court has expanded
upon the “less rigorous” level of scrutiny for political contributions Buckley
alluded to.237 In articulating this lesser standard, the Court has recognized
an expressive nature in contributions but, like Buckley, derived their
communicative value mainly from their symbolic support and facilitation
of the recipient’s expression, appraising it as less poignant than political
expression of the donor herself.238 As such, to satisfy the closely drawn
scrutiny test today, the government must demonstrate that its actions
further “a sufficiently important interest” and use methods that are “closely
drawn” to avoid unnecessary restrictions of First Amendment freedoms.239
Both the sufficiently important interest prong and the closely drawn prong
of this scrutiny standard are less rigorous than the compelling interest and
narrowly tailored/least restrictive requirements of strict and exacting
scrutiny. But the question is: how much less?
In 2003, McConnell v. FEC challenged statutory limitations on
political contributions based on a government interest in eliminating quid
pro quo corruption.240 McConnell’s application of closely drawn scrutiny is
illustrative. The plaintiffs in McConnell argued that because the record was
void of any evidence of instances of quid pro quo corruption, where “a
federal officeholder has actually switched a vote” in exchange for soft
money, Congress had failed to demonstrate a closely drawn sufficient state
interest.241 The Court, however, disagreed, opting instead for a broader
understanding of the relevant government interest in preventing corruption
and a looser fitting of the law to the government’s goal.242 The McConnell
Court broadened the government interests from just preventing quid pro
quo corruption (that according to the record did not exist) to include
preventing the appearance of corruption, corruption more generally, or the
“privileged access to and pernicious influence upon elected
237
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representatives.”243 Under closely drawn scrutiny, McConnell also
permitted government regulations to prevent corruption, even when those
regulations were not finely tuned to accomplish that interest and involved a
“significant interference” with First Amendment rights.244 The McConnell
Court noted further that closely drawn scrutiny is flexible enough for courts
to show “proper deference to Congress’ ability to weigh competing
constitutional interests in an area [such as campaign finance law] in which
it enjoys particular expertise.”245 Three years later in Randall v. Sorrell, the
Court described this weighing of interests when reviewing contribution
limitations as a balancing test, where courts must uphold limitations that
further an important state interest but strike down limitations that unduly
inhibit the political process.246
Most recently, campaign finance decisions have adopted the more
confined quid pro quo definition of corruption for supporting government
interests but preserved the lower level of “closely drawn” judicial scrutiny
for political contributions.247 McCutcheon v. FEC clarified that strict and
exacting scrutiny (which applies to political speech and expenditures)
requires a searching review that pays close attention to the “fit” between
the asserted government interest and governments’ policy choices. On the
other hand, the “fit” between the government interest and governments’
policy choices in closely drawn scrutiny (which applies to political
contributions) need not be as close.
Taken together, recent campaign finance decisions articulate how to
employ Buckley’s less demanding closely drawn scrutiny standard today.
Courts analyzing the government’s chosen means with the closely drawn
standard are prepared to uphold laws and regulations that further a
government interest, even if the regulation is a not a near-perfect fit for that
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down portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 but also reversed its own precedent of
allowing restrictions on political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity. Citizens United,
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government interest. By not requiring a perfectly tailored fit, closely drawn
scrutiny by implication suggests a regulation may be somewhat
overinclusive or underinclusive and still pass constitutional muster. Finally,
closely drawn scrutiny is flexible enough to allow judicial deference to
legislative expertise.
B. Compelled Third-Party Payments in Other Areas of the Law
To be sure, even the Abood Court would concede that not all
compelled contributions are compelled expression and not all compelled
contributions of others’ expression violate the First Amendment. Justice
Byron White pointed out as much in his separate opinion in Buckley,
reasoning that a belief otherwise would prove to be “entirely too much.”248
Moreover, the government enacts laws and regulatory schemes that compel
payments or subsidies that are not constitutionally questionable, regardless
of whether the payer agrees with their use.249 At the heart of this recognition
are government-imposed taxes, which routinely compel individuals to
make payments, even in support of government initiatives, services, or
speech that they oppose.250 Paying taxes, however, is not expressive, even
when government organizations use them to fund speech activities in
furtherance of their legitimate regulatory purpose because the speech is
attributed to the government as “government speech” and not an expressive
endorsement by the individual taxpayers. Catherine Fisk and Margaux
Poueymirou provide the apt example of a death penalty opponent who pays
her taxes knowing some part of them will be used by prosecutors to
advocate for the death penalty.251 By paying her taxes, she is not endorsing
the death penalty and no one would associate her with the prosecutor’s
speech made on behalf of the state.252
In addition to government speech, the government may also delegate
regulatory functions to private third parties and compel individuals to
subsidize their activities without implicating the First Amendment. When
the third party engages in political speech, the constitutional issue is more
complicated than pure government speech. The following Section examines
lines of cases where government-compelled payments to a third party are
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and are not considered expressive. As the larger framework of this Article
advocates, such payments are constitutional when part of a larger
appropriate regulatory scheme or comprehensive government initiative.
The Court has focused on the regulatory purpose behind compelled
payments to a third party in a series of cases addressing agriculturalsubsidy programs. In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., the Court
upheld a regulatory program that, among other things, required California
fruit growers to contribute money to pay for general advertisements.253 Just
four years after Glickman, however, the Court struck down a similar
requirement that mushroom farmers contribute to advertisements in United
States v. United Foods, Inc.254 In United Foods, the Court distinguished the
mushroom subsidies from the subsidies in Glickman because they were not
part of a larger regulatory purpose, independent of the speech itself.255 In
other words, the regulation creating the Mushroom Council and compelling
the subsidies was for the exclusive purpose of advertisement (or
expression), whereas in Glickman, “the mandated assessments for speech
were ancillary to a more comprehensive [regulatory] program.”256
As illustrated in Glickman and United Foods, the government may,
through legislation, delegate authority to a private entity and require
individuals to pay those private-entity activities that are reasonably
necessary to the delegated regulatory purpose. The Court has reaffirmed its
authority to do this in a series of professional bar association cases where
the government compels membership as part of granting access to a chosen
profession. In Keller v. State Bar of California, the Court said that the bar
could use compulsory dues only if the dues were “reasonably incurred for
the purpose of regulating the legal profession or ‘improving the quality of
the legal service available to the people of the State.’”257 Like Abood, Keller
granted a pro rata dues refund to members who objected to the bar’s
political or ideological expenditures.258
In sharp contrast to Abood and Keller’s refund requirements, the Court
upheld mandatory student activity fees at public universities in Board of
Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth.259 In
Southworth, the Court unanimously upheld the permissibility of requiring
253

521 U.S. 457, 460, 476–77 (1997).
533 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2001).
255
Id. at 414–16.
256
Id. at 411.
257
496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961) (plurality
opinion)).
258
Id. at 16–17 (adopting “Abood obligation[s]”—meaning objecting payers were entitled to a
refund of the bar association’s political expenses—as sufficient protections for bar dues objectors).
259
529 U.S. 217 (2000).
254

649

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

college students to pay money each semester to a fund that subsidized
student activities, part of which was given to groups with which they
disagreed.260 Although the plaintiffs argued that under Abood and Keller
this violated their First Amendment rights and that they were entitled to a
pro rata refund for the political and ideological activities with which they
disagreed, the Supreme Court rejected their claim.261 In doing so, the Court
recognized that mandatory subsidies of objectionable speech infringed on
students’ First Amendment rights, but it also recognized the “important and
substantial purpose[]” of student activity fees and “facilitat[ing] a wide
range of speech.”262 Therefore, on balance, student activity fees passed
constitutional muster without refunding students for objectionable
expenditures.263 The Southworth Court, however, in reasoning that the
university must provide some protection to its students’ First Amendment
interests, concluded that the university must allocate funding support in a
viewpoint-neutral manner.264
Initially, Southworth’s handling of compelled funding of political
speech cannot be easily reconciled with that of Abood and Keller. In all
three cases, there were compelled contributions to third parties. In all three
cases, the challengers objected that their money was being spent to support
political activities with which they disagreed. But in Southworth, the
students were not entitled to a pro rata refund, while the complainants in
Abood and Keller were. The difference between the three is that in
Southworth, the Court upheld the compelled political and ideological
contributions because it accepted the university’s important interest in
conveying a wide variety of messages, including those with which some
students disagreed.265 According to the Southworth Court, the Abood/Keller
approach of “limiting the required subsidy to [fund only] speech germane
to the purpose” of the university was “unworkable” because determining
what speech is germane to the university’s purpose of exposing students to
unexplored and diverse speech and ideas was contrary to the very goal the
university sought to pursue.266 In Abood and Keller, by contrast, the Court
260
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did not find a union or bar’s political speech activities to be germane to its
core purposes or goals. In other words, the distinction between Southworth,
Keller, and Abood is not in whether there was compelled expression but in
whether in the Court’s view, the expression was sufficiently justified to
meet the institution’s core goals. The justifiability of compelled
expression—if not accepted as a core institutional goal on its face as it was
in Southworth—is determined and limited by the statutory duties, as it was
in Glickman.
IV. RECONCILING MODERN FIRST AMENDMENT PRECEDENT WITH ABOOD
AND FUTURE PUBLIC SECTOR AGENCY FEE CASES
Without overruling Abood, the current Court has modified First
Amendment doctrine and expanded its protections in such a way that has
reopened the constitutionality question of agency fees in the public sector.
If the doctrinal inconsistencies were not clear enough, Justice Alito’s notso-subtle dicta in Knox and Harris most certainly conveyed the message
that the Court was finally prepared to overrule Abood and hold that the
First Amendment forbids agency shop agreements and fees in the public
sector.267 But a 4–4 decision in Friedrichs saved review of Abood’s
rationale for another day.268 With the Supreme Court now having a full
complement of Justices and review of Janus v. AFSCME impending, the
demise of Abood and the agency fees it permits may be imminent.
The preceding sections of this Article have attempted to show why
any bright-line approach to agency fees in the public sector would be ill
fitting. Public union activities are too transient for such an approach, and
state statutes are too diverse amongst jurisdictions. Thus, this final Section
proposes a workable compromise by suggesting that all agency fees are
indeed some form of compelled expression—but should be treated as
compelled political contributions in campaign finance, not as purely
political speech. Under the modern compelled contribution analysis, the
question of whether agency fees are “expressive” or “political” does not
doom their constitutionality under strict or exacting scrutiny review.269
Instead, because the expressive purposes are more attenuated than pure
speech, the limitations placed on contributions must be “closely drawn” to
match a “sufficiently important [government] interest.”270 While compelled
267
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contributions must be reasonable, legislatures should be accorded
substantial deference in articulating their sufficiently important interests.271
Although this modern framework for compelled contributions is
largely consistent with the Court’s 1976 decision in Buckley, the Court has
at times strayed from this appropriate understanding.272 However, with the
Court’s recent clarifications in McCutcheon, Buckley’s analysis and
“closely drawn scrutiny” appear to have been restored to their proper place
for at least the time being.
A. Adopting a Compelled Contribution Framework Respects the States’
Choice of Regulatory Regime
Adopting the compelled contribution framework for agency fee cases
in the public sector is superior to a hard-line approach because it enables
courts to give deference to state legislative efforts in the area of public
sector collective bargaining. Under the framework articulated in
McCutcheon, a case challenging campaign contribution limits under the
First Amendment, the first step of the constitutional analysis is to
determine whether the government has asserted a sufficiently important
interest.273 Once the government asserts an important interest, courts can
then assess whether that interest is linked to the policy choice necessitating
the compelled limitation or contribution.274 McCutcheon articulated that
while strict and exacting scrutiny pay close attention to this fit between the
important government interest and legislative policy choices,275 closely
drawn scrutiny’s flexibility allots for a less precise fit between the
government interests and its chosen prophylactic scheme.
In McCutcheon and its predecessors, the state government’s important
interest in limiting contributions was to prevent quid pro quo corruption. In
Abood and its successors, the state government’s important interest in
compelling contributions is to promote efficient labor relations and prevent
“free riding.” Both quid pro quo prevention and promoting efficient labor
relations state interests are somewhat abstruse state interests, and their
remedying statutes would be hard to justify as the best preventative matters
and easy to dispute. However, while this imperfect fit most likely dooms
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Abood’s (and McCutcheon’s) state legislative purpose under a strict or
exacting scrutiny analysis, these interests could survive under a “closely
drawn” scrutiny analysis, especially if courts afford the same judicial
deference to congressional expertise in labor statutes as it does to campaign
finance.
Lesser attention to the fit between governments interests and policy
choices is imperative if agency fees are to survive future First Amendment
analysis because it is nearly impossible to prove that agency fees are the
only means to efficient labor relations and preventing free riding. In an
exclusive bargaining regime, what is strikingly damning to such a tailored
attempt is that twenty-eight states and the federal government currently
perform labor functions within a “right to work,” or agency fee-free
jurisdiction. While it could be argued that these are far less efficient labor
regimes than those that permit agency fee collections in one form or
another, accepting legislative bodies’ propriety determinations requires
removal of the strict, or even exacting, scrutiny standards of review.
B. Adopting a Compelled Contribution Framework and Lesser Scrutiny
Standard Is True to the First Amendment Doctrine
Adopting the compelled contribution framework and lesser “closely
drawn” scrutiny standard in agency fee jurisprudence is true to the
foundational First Amendment principles of political speech and
association. While this Article takes no position on Citizens United’s
controversial decision that organizational contributions are sufficiently
expressive to trigger First Amendment protections, it recognizes that
scholars have logically argued both for and against it.276 Largely
uncontroversial, however, is the position that the spending of money—
while not itself speech—is necessary for effective advocacy in the United
States. As the Court has long recognized, “virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of
money.”277 But contributions do not express a particular message or
“communicate the underlying basis for the support.”278 For these reasons,
since Buckley, the First Amendment has protected money’s expressive
value to a lesser extent than pure speech or expression.279
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McCutcheon provided significant clarification as to what this extent
actually was. While it declined to venture into the realm of strict scrutiny
for financial expressions of any kind, McCutcheon applied “exacting
scrutiny” to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political
expression, such as political expenditures.280 However, because limits on
contributions “impose a lesser restraint on political speech” than do limits
on expenditures, they are subject to “a lesser but still ‘rigorous [closely
drawn] standard of review.’”281 With “closely drawn” scrutiny, “[e]ven a
significant interference with protected rights . . . may be sustained if the
State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational
freedoms.”282
To apply anything more than closely drawn scrutiny to agency fee
analysis in First Amendment challenges would give more credence to
compelled monetary contributions than the First Amendment intends. Even
voluntary contributions to a union, until aggregated, have little expressive
value. The contribution amount is small, and the purposes behind its
donation can be vastly diverse. Union members, who voluntarily give
money to a union, surely do not believe in every cause the union supports
or even that their money is being well spent. But because their contribution
is voluntary, it is accepted as a general expression of support of the union.
Remove the voluntary aspect of contributions, and their expressive purpose
is even less.
C. Adopting the Compelled Contribution Model Means Courts Will Not
Have to Choose Between Objecting Payers’ and Unions’ Rights
Because of modern First Amendment law’s disjointedness, choosing
to adopt one precedent over another requires a bit of cherry picking.283
Agency fee objectors who claim such fees violate payers’ First Amendment
rights are guilty of this because in preserving the rights of nonmembers,
they ignore the rights of unions and union members to engage in First
Amendment activities. Their attention to dissenters is not wholly
inconsistent with the individual speech protections of the First Amendment,
280
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which place a premium on unfettered discourse. However, on the campaign
spending side, because the Court recognizes that restricted spending is less
of an encroachment than restricted speech, it has developed a more
reasonable balancing method of individual infringements with other
interests.
In prior agency fee cases, the Court has assessed the constitutionality
of agency fee agreements by balancing the First Amendment rights of
agency fee payers against the government’s interest in combatting free
riders and promoting labor peace. But this distorts the balancing scale
because it portrays only one side (the payers) as having First Amendment
rights, while portraying the other as having only a statutory interest.
Citizens United’s expansion of First Amendment rights to expressive
groups, however, necessitates a rezeroing of this scale.284 If unions enjoy
First Amendment protections as expressive associations, should not their
rights also factor into this agency fee analysis? Should not the First
Amendment rights of a union, composed of real working people and
governed by democratic rules and majority consensus, receive at least the
same rights to influence the political process as an “artificial . . .
invisible . . . and existing only in contemplation of law” corporation?285
Moreover, if courts are going to protect nonmembers from being forced to
subsidize activities, should not they also protect unions from being forced
to subsidize nonmember activities and prohibit a duty of fair representation
regime?286
D. Suggestions for “Closely Drawn” Statutory Frameworks
If the Court adopts the framework for agency fee analysis articulated
in this Article, the logical next inquiry will consider what exactly a closely
drawn statutory framework that passes constitutional muster looks like. In
large part, I leave this query for future scholarly works but with the
following broad suggestions.
First, although “closely drawn” scrutiny will tolerate even
“significant” right infringements, legislative and union bodies advocating
for agency fees should consider statutory models that limit this
infringement to the utmost extent.287 For example, nonmember agency fee
payers should be able to participate in union surveys within their collective
284
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bargaining unit when such surveys impact the union collective bargaining
strategies that their fees subsidize.288 Moreover, they should be able to vote
on union proposals, contract ratification, and other elective matters.
Because their agency fees are going to support these union activities, they
should be given the same opportunities for voice as other members in these
union matters. Many unions already do survey an entire bargaining unit on
certain employment issues, and in future challenges, this fact should be
pertinent to a court’s analysis under “closely drawn” scrutiny analysis.
However, in future legislative schemes, lawmakers should consider
mandating such voter rights for agency-fee-subsidized representatives.
Once lawmakers establish this floor, unions may also choose to experiment
with other additional means of promoting agency-fee-payer voice and
participation in internal union matters. For example, they may undertake
certain controversial union activities only after approval by a voting
majority (or supermajority) of their particular bargaining unit.
Second, limiting the rights infringements of agency fees may be
brought about by limiting the agency fees themselves. Obviously, if the
Court adopts the “closely drawn” framework for agency-fee-permitting
statutes, the more detailed the regulatory language articulating the
representative’s duties, bargaining subjects, and relation to the limited fee,
the better.289 Seemingly vague agency fee limits or arbitrary
proportionalities of fees without justification will probably fail this scrutiny
standard.290
After specific regulatory language is drafted, unions themselves may
want to consider what is not explicitly included in the defined duties of an
exclusive bargaining representative and use these exclusions to create their
own limited agency fee models with the nonmembers they represent. For
example, while the duties of an exclusive bargaining representative
generally include “contract administration,” they usually do not include
language for “free contract administration.” Thus, perhaps unions could
offer a lesser agency fee calculation for those nonmembers who agree to
contract away their right to obtain free union representation in grievances.
288
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These members could instead be charged a fair market rate for the union’s
grievance representation services, should they end up needing it during a
year when they had waived that right.
CONCLUSION
With Janus v. AFSCME, the Court may finally have the last word on
agency fees in the public sector. But given the vast diversity in state
collective bargaining statutes and agency fee provisions, the legitimate and
complex interests at stake, and the evolving contours of First Amendment
jurisprudence, it would be unwise to entirely foreclose the possibility of
agency shop agreements and fees. A case-by-case analysis of agency fees
and their relation to a union’s statutory duties is a better fit for our modern
jurisprudence and our ever-changing political reality. Reexamining agency
fees in the public sector through the compelled contribution doctrine and
closely drawn scrutiny standard of campaign finance law offers this kind of
flexibility.
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